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TIPPING THE SCALE: IS THE SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR LEBANON 
INTERNATIONAL ENOUGH TO OVERRIDE STATE OFFICIAL IMMUNITY? 
Heather Noël Ludwig*  
The political environment in Lebanon is one plagued with a tumul-
tuous history of violence and power struggles. This turmoil climaxed on 
February 14, 2005, when the former Lebanese Prime Minister, Rafiq Hari-
ri, was assassinated in a terrorist attack. The Special Tribunal for Lebanon 
was subsequently created by the U.N. Security Council to try those respon-
sible for Hariri’s assassination. Previous international U.N.-created tri-
bunals have successfully eliminated head of state immunity protections of 
the accused. However, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon’s unique characte-
ristics prompt a weighty legal question, one who’s positive answer is vital 
for the Tribunal’s existence, especially if it is found that those responsible 
for the attack appear to be high-ranking state officials: Is the Special Tri-
bunal for Lebanon “international” enough to eliminate head of state im-
munity claims? 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
After the assassination of Former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri in 
Lebanon, the United Nations, at the request of the Lebanese government, 
did something it had never done before. It created a tribunal to try a possible 
event of ―terrorism.‖1 The validity of this judicial body as an ―international‖ 
tribunal is highly debated, specifically because in contrast to other interna-
tional U.N.-created tribunals before it, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon 
(STL) (1) will only try cases of terrorism and terrorism-related offenses; (2) 
has a subject matter jurisdiction framed only with references to domestic 
  
 1 The concept of creating an international definition for the crime of terrorism is ad-
dressed infra Part III.C.6 
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law; and (3) has a statute that does not explicitly eliminate state official im-
munity.2  
The counsel of the accused before the STL may claim the tribunal is 
not a legitimate ―international‖ court. If the Chambers of the STL concludes 
that the court is not an ―international‖ tribunal, the STL prosecution may be 
unable to eliminate any high-ranking state immunity protections of the ac-
cused. Without circumventing immunity protections, the success of the STL 
to try those responsible for the Hariri assassination and related attacks may 
be in jeopardy. However, both the characteristics the STL shares with other 
ad-hoc and hybrid tribunals and the international trend to define terrorist 
acts as the most egregious crimes in the world aids in tipping the scale to 
favor the STL being categorized as ―international.‖ This categorization of 
―international‖ will equip the court with the ability to eliminate any state 
official immunity protections of the accused. More importantly, it will rede-
fine the scope of crimes that future U.N.-created tribunals will be permitted 
to try, as well as the scope of the sovereign rights nations possess with re-
spect to trying crimes of terrorism. 
This Note begins by exploring the background and legal history sur-
rounding the creation of the STL in Part II. Part III provides a legal analysis 
that evaluates the factors used in determining if the STL is an ―internation-
al‖ court, including: (1) the authority vested to the court; (2) the characteris-
tics of the court; and (3) the subject matter jurisdiction of the court. A visual 
comparison of the characteristics analysis completed in Part III is appended 
to the note in Annex 1 for reader reference. Finally, this Note examines how 
the crimes being tried before the STL affect the ability of both the STL and 
future U.N.-created tribunals in trying crimes of ―terrorism.‖ Specifically, it 
answers the question whether crimes of ―terrorism‖ can be considered ―in-
ternational‖ enough for courts to eliminate high-ranking state official im-
munities. 
II. THE BACKGROUND AND LEGAL HISTORY OF THE SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR 
LEBANON 
A.  The Historical Development of International Criminal Tribunals  
The creation of international tribunals to try criminals for crimes so 
heinous that they offend the conscience of humankind began after World 
War II when a group of ambitious lawyers, along with the aid of the Allied 
Powers, tried Nazis at the International Military Tribunals at Nuremburg.3 
  
 2 See Melia Amal Bouhabib, Power and Perception: The Special Tribunal for Lebanon, 3 
BERK. J. MIDDLE E. & ISLAMIC L. 173, 191–95 (2009). 
 3 See Lindsey Raub, Note, Positioning Hybrid Tribunals in International Criminal Jus-
tice, 41 N.Y.U. J. INT‘L L. & POL. 1013, 1013–14 (2009). 
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The Nuremburg trials established that individuals have duties under interna-
tional law, and that responsibility will attach to individuals when they 
commit such heinous crimes.4 The international legal environment contin-
ued to evolve since the Nuremburg trials, and eighteen years ago, the first 
U.N.-based international criminal tribunal was created.5 Today, U.N.-hybrid 
and ad-hoc courts prosecute, as well as sentence, criminals from a variety of 
different countries.6 The international community continually faces new 
challenges in upholding justice and defining global norms of responsibility. 
These new challenges require the creation of innovative types of U.N.-
tribunals. One tribunal addressing a subject matter never employed by pre-
vious UN-created courts is the STL.  
―International‖ crimes, also referred to as stricto senso crimes, fall 
within the subject matter jurisdiction of all international U.N.-created tri-
bunals except the STL.7 In general, stricto senso crimes are forms of con-
duct so egregious that those who engage in the acts are considered ―enemies 
of all mankind.‖ Accordingly, all nations of the world have an interest in 
ensuring the responsible individuals are prosecuted.8 The idea that certain 
crimes are ―international‖ stems back to the Nuremberg trials when Justice 
Jackson explained the authority to try certain crimes existed because, ―those 
acts which offended the conscience of our people . . . [were] criminal by 
standards generally accepted in all civilized countries.‖9 Jackson relied on 
historic precedent from The Hague Conventions of 1907, the Kellogg-
Briand pact of 1928, and the Geneva Protocol of 1924 to define the scope of 
stricto senso crimes.10 Since Nuremberg, several other tribunals have voiced 
opinions about the power of tribunals both national and international to try 
international stricto senso crimes. 
  
 4 Id. 
 5 Larry D. Johnson, Lecture, UN-Based International Criminal Tribunals: How They Mix 
and Match, 36 DENV. J. INT‘L L. & POL‘Y 275, 276 (2008). 
 6 Id. (countries include the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Cambodia, and 
Lebanon). 
 7 See Cécile Aptel, Some Innovations in the Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, 5 
J. INT‘L CRIM. JUST. 1107, 1107–08, 1111 (2007); see also infra Part III.C.6.b for a further 
discussion of international stricto senso crimes. 
 8 See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Pinochet and International Human Rights 
Litigation, 97 MICH L. REV. 2129, 2133–34 (1999). 
 9 U.S. DEPT. OF STATE BULLETIN, Report of Robert H. Jackson to the President on Atroci-
ties and War Crimes (June 7, 1945), available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/imt_jack 
01.asp. 
 10 See MICHAEL P. SCHARF & MICHAEL A. NEWTON, Terrorism and Crimes Against Hu-
manity, in LEILA SADAT, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY (forthcoming) (discussing prosecuting 
war crimes as a part of the ―laws of humanity‖ in the Hague Conventions, renouncing war in 
the Kellogg-Briand Pact, and declaring wars of aggression as international crimes in the 
Geneva Protocol). 
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Stricto senso international crimes include genocide, war crimes, and 
crimes against humanity.11 In contrast, the STL may only try cases of crimes 
of ―terrorism,‖ offenses against life and personal integrity, illicit associa-
tions, and failure to report crimes and offenses that stem from the car bomb-
ing of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hirari and twenty-two others.12 Addi-
tionally, the explicit subject matter jurisdiction of the STL statute encom-
passes only Lebanese domestic law.13 While the statues of other U.N.-
created tribunals provide for jurisdiction over a mix of international and 
domestic crimes, none outside the STL has ever tried only domestically 
defined crimes.14 Finally, the STL‘s statute does not explicitly eliminate 
state official immunity, while the statutes of other U.N.-created tribunals 
before it explicitly eliminate immunity protections.15 Combined, these is-
sues may cause significant problems for the court if those responsible for 
the Hariri attack appear to be high-ranking state officials, who would nor-
mally have official immunity from prosecution in a national court.16 The 
aforementioned divergences between the STL and traditional international 
courts provoke heated debate in the international legal community about 
which factors are required for a court to be considered ―international‖ 
enough to remove the immunity of an accused state official.  
B.  The History of the Creation of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon 
Two years after the Hariri attack, Lebanon signed an agreement 
with the United Nations to create the STL.17 The tribunal will try individu-
als deemed responsible for the attack and for subsequent related events, 
which occurred between October 1, 2004, and December 12, 2005, and re-
sembled the Hariri Attack in manner and purpose.18 The Lebanese Parlia-
ment failed to ratify the agreement for the tribunal by June 10, 2007, 
through its domestic legislative process.19 However, the Security Council 
  
 11 Id.  
 12 Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, S.C. Res. 1757, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1757 
(May 30, 2007).The STL may try these crimes as they are defined under the Lebanese Crim-
inal Code. 
 13 Id. art. 2. 
 14 Aptel, supra note 7, at 1107–08, 1111. 
 15 Id. at 1110. 
 16 See generally Bouhabib, supra note 2. 
 17 See generally id. (The STL was created by Security Council Resolution 1757 on May 
30, 2007, and the agreement between Lebanon and the United Nations is annexed to Resolu-
tion 1757); see also Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon supra, note 12. 
 18 Bouhabib, supra note 2, at 12; see also Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, 
supra note 12. 
 19 U.N. Secretary-General, Rep. of the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council 
Resolution 1757 (2007) of 30 May 2007, U.N. Doc. S/2007/525 (Sept. 4, 2007). 
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desired to establish the tribunal immediately. Accordingly, the Security 
Council disregarded the Lebanese legislative stalemate and authorized the 
formation of the tribunal under its Chapter VII powers, with a vote of ten 
members approving and five abstaining.20  
The United Nations also initiated a fact-finding mission to investi-
gate the attacks and the adequacy of the subsequent investigation by Leba-
nese authorities. The Security Council welcomed the commission‘s report, 
which stated that there was probable cause that high-ranking state officials 
were involved in the Hariri assassination especially considering the com-
plexity of the attacks.21 
Although no indictment has been made public yet,22 the involve-
ment of high-ranking state officials, if any, would potentially lead to several 
future claims of state official immunity before the STL. If the claims for 
immunity are recognized, the tribunal would be prevented from prosecuting 
any high-ranking state officials involved with the attacks.23 On the other 
hand, if it is determined that the STL is an ―international‖ court, immunity 
claims of the accused will be circumvented.24 The complexity of this issue 
is compounded by the several attributes of the STL that are unique from any 
other U.N.-created court.25 As previously mentioned in this Note, these 
  
 20 Id; see also U.N. SCOR, 62nd Sess., 5685th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.5685 (May 30, 
2007). 
 21 S.C. Res. 1636, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1636 (June 31, 2005) (responding to the report of the 
United Nations International Independent Investigation Commission (S/2005/662) concern-
ing its investigation into the February 14, 2005 terrorist bombing in Beirut, Lebanon, that 
killed former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and 22 others, and caused injury to do-
zens of people). 
 22 Press Release, Radhia Achouri, Special Tribunal for Lebanon Office of the Prosecutor, 
The Office of the Prosecutor of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon Responds to Speculations 
on its Work, Special Tribunal for Lebanon Press Release No.2010/003 (Mar. 26, 2010), 
available at http://www.stl-tsl.org/sid/183 (stating that any information regarding the indict-
ment reported by individuals other than the Prosecutor or his Official Spokesperson is solely 
speculation); see also Arthur Blok, Exclusive to NOW Lebanon: Bellemare: No Indictment in 
September (Aug. 31, 2010), http://www.nowlebanon.com/NewsArchiveDetails.aspx?ID=198 
004 (In this interview, Bellamare asserted that he is the only one who knows about the in-
formation on the indictment. He also referred to claims made by media sources regarding the 
indictment as ―outrageous‖ and stated that unless, ―they can read into my brain, everything 
else is just speculation.‖). 
 23 William A. Schabas, The Special Tribunal for Lebanon: Is a “Tribunal of an Interna-
tional Character” Equivalent to an “International Criminal Court”?, 21 LEIDEN J. INT‘L L. 
513, 527 (2008). 
 24 Id. 
 25 See generally id. at 514 (looking to the subtopic‘s of Schabas‘s article for direction on 
factors used in determining if a court is ―international‖); see also INT‘L CTR. FOR 
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE PROSECUTIONS PROGRAM, HANDBOOK ON THE SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR 
LEBANON 9–31 (2008), available at http://www.ictj.org/images/content/9/1/914.pdf (compar-
ing and contrasting the STL to other international ad-hoc and hybrid tribunals, and displaying 
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attributes include the STL being the first tribunal of international character 
that: (1) will hear solely cases of crimes of terrorism and terrorism-related 
offenses; (2) has subject matter jurisdiction framed only with references to 
domestic law; and (3) has a statute that does not eliminate state official im-
munity, a provision that was included in the statutes of all other U.N.-
created tribunals before it.26 Limiting the subject matter jurisdiction of STL 
the will play a major role in defining the tribunal. It will either contribute to 
its downfall or will allow the STL to blaze a groundbreaking legal path by 
redefining the current doctrine of international criminal law, specifically 
concerning international crimes of ―terrorism.‖  
To determine if the STL is an international tribunal, a comparison 
must be completed of the STL and previous international U.N.-created tri-
bunals. The individual attributes of each U.N.-created tribunal are first indi-
vidually analyzed in a legal context. A visual comparative representation of 
the STL, previous U.N.-created hybrid and ad-hoc tribunals, and the Inter-
national Criminal Court (ICC) is appended in an Annex to this Note for ease 
of comparison.27 This Note will then evaluate if the subject matter jurisdic-
tion of the STL, the Hariri assassination, and related attacks are acts of ter-
rorism so egregious that they may be considered crimes against humanity. 
Specifically, this Note focuses on how this categorization of the attacks may 
further tip the scale in favor the STL being international enough to eliminate 
head of state immunity protection.  
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS  
A.  Defining an “International” Court 
The Nuremburg Tribunal first explained that restrictive immunity is 
required for individuals being tried for stricto senso crimes before an inter-
national court.28 Additionally, the Tribunal established that high-ranking 
state official immunity claims must be eliminated for all international 
courts.29 This groundbreaking international court stated that ―[c]rimes 
  
that there exists a strong precedent in international law for eliminating immunity claims 
when the accused individuals are being tried before international courts). 
 26 Schabas, supra note 23 at 524–27. The author disagrees with Schabas and argues that 
provisions eliminating state official immunity and withdraw of the defense of official capaci-
ty are different concepts, specifically because both provisions protect high ranking officials 
from possible prosecution before the court as Schabas pointed out occurred in the Yeroida 
(Arrest Warrant Case - ICJ), Milosevic (ICTY), and Taylor (SCSL) cases (noting that some 
tribunals including the ICTY and SCSL have provisions eliminating the ―official‖ defense.). 
 27 See app. 1. 
 28 International Military Tribunal (Nuremburg) Judgment and Sentences, as reprinted in 
41 AM. J. INT‘L L. 172, 221 (1946). 
 29 Id.  
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against international law are committed by men, and not by abstract entities, 
and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provi-
sions of international law be enforced.‖30  
More recently, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) echoed the 
Nuremburg sentiment in the Arrest Warrant case when it stated that al-
though courts of a third state are barred from trying heads of state, ―certain 
international criminal courts‖ can try high-ranking state officials if the in-
ternational courts have jurisdiction.31 The Arrest Warrant court did not de-
fine the criteria required for identifying ―international courts,‖ but distin-
guished international courts from courts of ―foreign jurisdiction‖ or of ―one 
state.‖32 Additionally, the court listed examples of international courts in-
cluding the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, and the future ICC.33 The ex-
amples enumerated by the court in Arrest Warrant case are all U.N.-created 
tribunals, and like the STL, were formed under the Security Council‘s 
Chapter VII powers.34 
The Special Court of Sierra Leone (SCSL) is a further example of a 
U.N.-created tribunal capable of eliminating high-ranking state official im-
munity claims. Specifically, the SCSL removed immunity protections from 
Liberia‘s former President in Prosecutor v. Charles Taylor.35 The SCSL 
supported its decision to remove Charles Taylor‘s (Taylor) immunities by 
  
 30 Id.  
 31 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. of the Congo v. Belgium) [hereinafter 
Arrest Warrant], Judgment of 14 February 2002, ICJ Rep. 3 para. 61 (2002) (citing through-
out how a Brussels court issued an arrest warrant for the incumbent minister of foreign af-
fairs of Congo, Abdulaye Yerodia Ndombasi (hereinafter Yerodia) for crimes against human-
ity and other crimes under international law that violated the 1949 Geneva Conventions for 
allegedly inciting the massacre of a Tutsi ethnic group in Kinshasa. The Democratic Repub-
lic of Congo claimed that immunity protections for Yerodia must be upheld because he was a 
current Minister of Foreign Affairs. The International Court of Justice enumerated positions 
that receive immunity protections including; Diplomats, Heads of State, Heads of Govern-
ment, and Ministers of Foreign Affairs. Holding, in a final binding decision that the interna-
tional circulation of an arrest warrant by Belgium violated the foreign minister‘s personal 
immunity from criminal prosecutions. Restricting the scope of immunity from criminal juris-
diction for an incumbent Minister for Foreign Affairs on the basis of international customary 
law.); See also Schabas, supra note 23, at 514. 
 32 Arrest Warrant, supra note 31; see also Arrest Warrant, Judgment of 14 February 2002 
(2001) (After defining the scope of immunities afforded to current high-ranking state offi-
cials, the court enumerated the exceptions to claims of immunity for both current and former 
high-ranking officials, including powers afforded to ―certain international criminal courts.‖). 
 33 Id. (stating that these courts do have jurisdiction over individuals from a third party 
state). 
 34 Id. para. 61. 
 35 Prosecutor v. Charles Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-I, para. 53 (May 31, 2004) [he-
reinafter Taylor]. 
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relying on the tribunal‘s status as an ―international court.‖36 In the case, 
Taylor, the former President of Liberia, was indicted for crimes against hu-
manity, war crimes, and other serious violations of both national and inter-
national law, including acts of terrorism.37 Taylor challenged the validity of 
his indictment, claiming the charges were issued while he was still in office, 
and that the indictment was contrary to the immunity afforded to a head of 
state under international law.38 The SCSL rejected his argument based on 
the Statutes of the Nuremberg and Tokyo International Military Tribunals; 
the approach and authority vested in ad-hoc international criminal courts; 
the approach to immunity protections taken by the ICC; and the holdings in 
the Arrest Warrant and Pinochet cases.39 The SCSL chambers stated—
concerning the immunities afforded to high-ranking officials—that ―the 
principle seems now established that the sovereign equality of states does 
not prevent a Head of State from being prosecuted before an international 
criminal tribunal or court.‖40  
While strong authority exists for denying the immunity claims of 
individuals being tried before U.N.-created ―international‖ courts, no bright 
line rule for defining ―international‖ courts currently exists. A survey of 
relevant case law reveals there are several factors courts balance to deter-
mine if a court is ―international‖ enough to eliminate head of state immuni-
ties: (1) the authority vested to the court; (2) the characteristics of the court; 
and (3) the subject matter jurisdiction of the court.41 The STL‘s attributes 
that are distinctive from other U.N.-created tribunals create a challenging 
  
 36 Id. para. 54. 
 37 Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-I, Indictment, paras. 32–59 (March 7, 2003) (Count 
one of the indictment charged Mr. Taylor with Acts of Terrorism in violation of article 3 
Common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II, allowing him to be pu-
nished under Article 3.d of the SCSL Statute.). 
 38 Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-I, paras. 1–8 (May 21, 2004). 
 39 Id. paras. 34–60; see also generally Arrest Warrant, supra note 31 (describing facts and 
holding of case); see also generally Regina v. Bow Street Magistrate, Ex parte Pinochet, 
[1999] 2 W.L.R. 827 (H.L.) (Authorities issued an international arrest warrant to apprehend 
the former head of state of Chile, Augusto Pinochet, for allegations of torture during his time 
as Chile‘s head of state. United Kingdom (UK) officials arrested Pinochet while he was 
visiting the UK and Spain then requested his extradition. The Law Lords determined that 
customarily a former head of state such as Pinochet would be afforded immunity for acts of 
torture, however the court did not grant him immunity because Chile had ratified the Torture 
Convention of 1988 and consequently waived head of state immunity protections for acts of 
torture.). 
 40 Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-I, para. 52 (May 31, 2004). 
 41 See generally Schabas, supra note 23 (looking to the subtopic‘s of Schabas‘s article for 
direction on factors); See also generally INT‘L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 
25 (comparing and contrasting the STL to other international ad-hoc and hybrid tribunals 
throughout the handbook leading to several evaluative factors that are similar to those Scha-
bas points out in his article). 
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task for those attempting to determine if the STL is international enough to 
eliminate high-ranking official immunities.42 Each of the factors used to 
determine the level of a court‘s ―international‖ character, as well as the 
presence of these factors in the STL, will be addressed, beginning with the 
level of authority vested to a tribunal. 
B.  Level of Authority Vested by the International Community to the 
Special Tribunal for Lebanon 
The level of authority vested to a tribunal is determined by evaluat-
ing (1) the specific mode of establishment used to create the court; (2) the 
explicit powers granted to the court through its statute; (3) the level of sup-
port expressed by the Security Council during the court‘s creation; and (4) 
the general evolution of tribunal at the United Nations during its establish-
ment. When examining these factors in relation to the STL, it becomes ap-
parent that the STL has a level of vested authority similar in scope to other 
U.N.-established international tribunals. 
1.  Mode of establishment of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon 
The mode of establishment used to create a court is one factor 
weighed when determining if the STL is a legitimate international court, 
and if the level of authority vested in the court mirrors the level afforded to 
other international courts by the international community.43 The STL was 
created through Security Council Resolution 1757 (Resolution 1757), which 
enacted an agreement negotiated between the United Nations and the Leba-
nese government. Resolution 1757 was adopted under the Security Coun-
cil‘s Chapter VII enforcement powers.44 This mode of establishment is 
unique from the methods used to form other ad-hoc and hybrid international 
tribunals, because it integrates two traditional methods of establishment.45 
The forms of establishment for previous U.N.-created international tribunals 
include (1) a Security Council Resolution passed under Chapter VII ―peace-
keeping‖ enforcement powers; (2) an agreement to establish the tribunal 
between the United Nations and the nation the tribunal is created for; and 
(3) a multilateral treaty.46 
  
 42 See supra Part II.B. (referring to the STL as the first United Nations endorsed tribunal 
that: (1) will hear solely cases of crimes of terrorism and terrorism-related offenses, (2) with 
subject matter jurisdiction framed only with references to domestic law; and (3) who‘s sta-
tute does not eliminate state official immunity like other U.N.-created tribunals before it.). 
 43 Johnson, supra note 5, at 276–77. 
 44 Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, supra note 12. 
 45 Johnson, supra note 5, at 276–77. 
 46 Id. 
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Through a Security Council Resolution, states may choose to bring 
alleged perpetrators of international crimes before an international tribunal 
instead of a national court.47 The Security Council represented the will of 
the international community and established two U.N.-backed ad-hoc tri-
bunals, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), under its 
Chapter VII peacekeeping enforcement powers.48 Establishing a tribunal 
through a Security Council Resolution under the Council‘s Chapter VII 
peacekeeping enforcement powers is a valid method of creating an interna-
tional court.49 The option to bring perpetrators of crimes of international law 
before a U.N.-sponsored tribunal is recognized in Article VI of the Geno-
cide Convention, the commentary to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and 
throughout the Nuremburg Judgment.50  
Alternatively, a tribunal may be created through a bilateral treaty 
between the United Nations and the tribunals‘ respective countries. Two 
U.N.-backed hybrid tribunals, the SCSL and Extraordinary Chambers in the 
Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), were established by a bilateral agreement. 
The SCSL was established when Sierra Leone signed a treaty with the Secu-
rity Council.51 The ECCC was created through a treaty between Cambodia 
and the U.N. General Assembly.52 These tribunals were not imposed on the 
countries concerned like the ITCY and ITCR were with Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda, respectively. Instead, they were created with the consent and at the 
request of each nation.53 In contrast, the STL was created when the Security 
Council through its Chapter VII peacekeeping enforcement powers unilate-
  
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. 
 49 See VIRGINIA MORRIS AND MICHAEL P. SCHARF, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA 82,87–88 (Transnational Publishers Inc. New York, NY 1998) (this 
peacekeeping power is consistent with the powers granted to the Security Council through 
the United Nations Charter). 
 50 VIRGINIA MORRIS AND MICHAEL P. SCHARF, AN INSIDER‘S GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 37 (Transnational Publishers Inc. New 
York, NY 1995). 
 51 See generally Agreement Between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra 
Leone on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone (Jan. 16, 2002), available at 
http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=CLk1rMQtCHg%3D&tabid=176. 
 52 See generally Agreement Between the United Nations and the Royal Government of 
Cambodia Concerning the Prosecution Under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed During 
the Period of Democratic Kampuchea (June, 6 2003), available at http://www.eccc.gov.kh/ 
english/agreement_image.aspx. 
 53 Johnson, supra note 5, at 277. 
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rally passed an agreement it had formed earlier with Lebanon. 54 To date, 
Lebanon has not ratified the agreement for the STL.55  
Critics claim this unique method of creating a U.N.-backed tribunal 
may not be valid, and that the Security Council overstepped its powers. Es-
pecially if the Security Council considered the method of creation for the 
STL to be a treaty forcibly passed through its ―peacekeeping‖ powers.56 
Additionally, critics assert that because the Lebanese Parliament has yet to 
ratify the STL agreement, the tribunal is unconstitutional and not endorsed 
by the Lebanese population.57 In November 2006, the United Nations Legal 
Counsel, Nicolas Michel, addressed this issue, telling the Security Council: 
[T]he Lebanese constitutional process for the conclusion of an agreement 
with the United Nations has not been completed. Major steps remain to be 
taken, in particular formal approval by the Government, which is the pre-
requisite for the signature of the treaty and its submission for parliamenta-
ry approval and, ultimately, its ratification.
58
 
Regardless of this difficulty, like the ICTY, ICTR, ECCC, and the 
SCSL before it, the STL was created after careful consideration of the vari-
ous options for establishment .59 The Security Council was forced to create 
the STL unilaterally using its Chapter VII powers because of the Lebanese 
legislative stalemate. It likely did not intend to bring the agreement into 
force as an international treaty binding Lebanon, but instead implemented 
Lebanon‘s request to create a tribunal.60 Prime Minister Fouad Siniora first 
  
 54 Id.; see also Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, supra note 12. 
 55 PressTV, ‗Justice, Main victim in Hariri tribunal‘ (Thursday January 13, 2011 9:38AM) 
(this article is a transcript of Press TV‘s interview with Daoud Khairallah, Georgetown Uni-
versity professor of law), available at http://www.presstv.ir/detail/159941.html. 
 56 See Bardo Fassbender, Reflections on the International Legality of the Special Tribunal 
for Lebanon, 5 J. INT‘L CRIM. JUST. 1091, 1093 (2007) (discussing the necessity of a coun-
try‘s formal parliamentary approval of an agreement in order for ratification to be valid); see 
also U.N. Charter ch. VII, available at http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter7. 
shtml (describing the peacekeeping powers of the Security Council). 
 57 See Fassbender, supra note 56, at 1091–1104 (discussing how the Security Council 
intended to create a treaty by entering into force the U.N.-Lebanese annexed agreement to 
Resolution 1757, which created a court to try the Hariri assassination, and that this treaty is 
not valid because the Lebanese Parliament never actually ratified the agreement). 
 58 U.N. Secretary-General, Rep. of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Spe-
cial Tribunal for Lebanon, Addendum, U.N. Doc. S/2006/893/Add.1 (Nov. 21, 2006). 
 59 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 49, at 79–82, 88–89 (discussing the Security Council‘s 
consideration of the disadvantages of each method of establishment when creating a tribun-
al). 
 60 See Fassbender, supra note 56, at 1097–1100 (arguing that this is the only legally per-
missible method to create a tribunal when the events leading up to the creation of the STL 
are taken into consideration). 
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approached the United Nations and requested that a tribunal be created.61 
Lebanon has not yet accepted the agreement for the STL through its consti-
tutional process only because the Lebanese Parliament has not approved the 
STL‘s plan.62 The lack of legislative approval is only due to the fact the 
Lebanese Parliament speaker, Nabih Berri, refuses to convene the chamber 
to address the tribunal‘s creation.63  
In Taylor, the appeals chamber of the SCSL faced a similar scena-
rio. The defense argued that a court formed through an agreement between 
the Security Council and the Sierra Leone government was not a valid court, 
specifically because it does not have the Chapter VII enforcement powers 
that ad-hoc tribunals possess.64 However, the court held that the SCSL is 
indeed an international court. In its decision, the Taylor Chambers ex-
plained that the one must look beyond the SCSL enforcement powers of a 
court to determine if it is a valid international court. The Taylor Chambers 
pointed to a courts mode of establishment as an additional factor when de-
termining if a court is ―international.‖ Specifically, it named a previous 
SCSL case referred to as the ―Decision on Constitutionality,‖ in which the 
defense argued that although the Sierra Leone government ratified the 
agreement between the United Nations and Sierra Leone for the SCSL, the 
agreement was not approved by a popular referendum because no such refe-
rendum was held. The defense in the ―Decision on Constitutionality‖ case 
claimed a lack of referendum support made the SCSL an unconstitutional 
creation because approval by referendum is required for bringing a treaty 
into force under the Sierra Leone Constitution.65 Ultimately, the ―Decision 
on Constitutionality‖ court rejected the defense argument and held that a 
referendum was not required to validate the SCSL because it was (1) an 
international court established by a treaty between the United Nations and 
  
 61 Chargé d‘affaires a.i, Letter dated 13 Dec. 2005 from the Chargé d‘affaires a.i of the 
Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the U.N. addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. 
S/2005/783 (Dec. 13, 2005). 
 62 See Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Authorized Establishment of 
Special Tribunal to Try Suspects in Assassination of Rafiq Hariri, U.N. Press Release 
SC/9029 (May 30, 2007) (describing the Lebanon Parliament‘s efforts to convene and ap-
prove the tribunal). 
 63 See id.  
 64 Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-I, Decision on Immunity from Jurisdic-
tion, ¶¶ 6–8 (May 31, 2004) [hereinafter Decision on Immunity from Jurisdiction]. 
 65 See id. ¶ 34 (stating that the legal status of the Special Court is a main issue in the mo-
tion); see also Prosecutor v. Kallon, Norman & Kamara, Case No. SCSL-2004-15-AR72(E), 
Decision on Constitutionality and Lack of Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 3, 8, 10, 15 (Mar. 13, 2004) [he-
reinafter Decision on Constitutionality] (arguing that the Government of Sierra Leone acted 
unconstitutionally and had no lawful authority to enter into an agreement for the tribunal 
because it failed to secure the ratification by popular referendum: a process required by the 
country‘s constitution to bring a treaty into force). 
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Sierra Leone outside of the Sierra Leone court system and is not part of the 
Sierra Leone Judiciary,66 and (2) is distinctive from domestic courts because 
the SCSL has powers that domestic courts do not possess.67  
The Taylor Chambers added to the holding of the ―Decision on 
Constitutionality‖ court and stated that an agreement to create the tribunal 
between Sierra Leone and the United Nations was the equivalent of an 
agreement between Sierra Leone and all members of the United Nations.68 
Additionally, the creation of the binding United Nations agreement was a 
representation of the overall will of the international community (including 
Sierra Leone) to try the crimes committed in Sierra Leone at an internation-
al level.69 Under these lines of reasoning, the Taylor court defined the tri-
bunal as a ―truly international.‖ 70 Like the SCSL, the STL was also created 
by the United Nations at the request of a national government and an 
agreement reflecting this request was created. However, unlike Sierra 
Leone, the Lebanese government has not approved the creation of the tri-
bunal through any portion of its legislative process.  
Answering the arguments of critics cited above, it appears Lebanon 
does not expressly disapprove of the STL. Although, Lebanese legislative 
action regarding the STL has not yet taken place, the will of the Lebanese 
people is unknown only because Nabih Berri is refusing to convene parlia-
ment, thereby purposefully freezing the political process.71 Additionally, the 
Lebanese government was actively involved in creating the STL statute and 
agreement.72 Adhering to Lebanon‘s requests, the Security Council adopted 
the STL‘s Resolution under its Chapter VII Article 39 powers of ―promot-
ing international peace and security.‖73 Lebanon has also since signed a 
  
 66 See Decision on Constitutionality, supra note 65, ¶¶ 42–43, 49, 52–53 (stating that the 
Special Court is a treaty-based generis court of mixed jurisdiction and therefore not part of 
Sierra Leone‘s judiciary). 
 67 See id. ¶ 50 (citing Article 11(d) of the Special Court Agreement which allows the Spe-
cial Court to ―enter into agreements with States as may be necessary for the exercise of its 
functions and for the operation of the Special Court.‖, allowing the Special Court to conclude 
treaties, a power that is unavailable to the national Sierra Leone courts.). 
 68 See Prosecutor v. Taylor, supra note 64, ¶ 38 (―It is to be observed that in carrying out 
its duties under its responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, the 
Security Council acts on behalf of the members of the United Nations.‖). 
 69 Id.  
 70 Id.  
 71 Marieke Wierda, Habib Nassar,& Lynn Maalouf, Early Reflections on Local Percep-
tions, Legitimacy and Legacy of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, 5 J. INT‘L CRIM. JUST. 
1065, 1074 (2007). 
 72 See INT‘L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 25, at 9, 13–14 (discussing the 
origins of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon and the events leading to Security Council Reso-
lution 1757). 
 73 U.N. Charter art., supra note 56, art. 39. 
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Memorandum of Understanding (―MOU‖) with the STL. The MOU prom-
ises cooperation between Office of the Prosecutor (―OTP‖) and the ―Leba-
nese Ministries, Lebanese juridical authorities and other official institutions, 
as necessary,‖ and specifically guarantees that the Lebanese Government 
will provide the OTP with all necessary assistance from Lebanon to fulfill 
its mandate.74 These collaborative efforts between the United Nations and 
Lebanon exemplify the Lebanese government‘s further support for the STL.  
Additionally, the STL agreement uses the same language as the 
SCSL agreement, which was cited by the ―Decision on Constitutionality‖ 
court, giving the STL powers that Lebanese courts do not possess. Specifi-
cally, the STL and SCSL agreements provide the tribunals the ability to 
conclude treaties with States as needed for the function and operation of the 
court.75 Like the SCSL, the STL was created by the United Nations, outside 
of the Lebanese Judiciary system, at the request of a national government, 
and has powers afforded to it unique from the national Lebanese courts. The 
inability of the Lebanese government to ratify the agreement for the STL, 
while unfortunate, does not affect its validity as a U.N.-created tribunal. 
Although, the mode of establishment will not affect the legitimacy of the 
STL, the documents created during its establishment will affect the en-
forcement powers the tribunal is afforded.  
The agreement and statute for the STL obligate Lebanon to comply 
with tribunal decisions. However, the documents are silent as to the tribun-
al‘s powers to require other states to comply with its orders and requests. 76 
Formation of a tribunal through a bilateral treaty affords the court no en-
forcement powers for orders and requests outside of the states concerned 
with the tribunals.77 In contrast, establishing a tribunal through a Security 
Council-imposed resolution binds all United Nations member states to the 
resolution, and requires nations to comply with the tribunal‘s orders under 
the Security Council‘s Chapter VII enforcement powers. It also allows the 
Security Council to impose sanctions on states that do not comply with a 
tribunal request.78 The Security Council‘s Chapter VII enforcement powers 
  
 74 Memorandum of Understanding Regarding the Modalities of Cooperation, Leb.-Off. of 
the Prosecutor of the STL, SPECIAL TRIB. FOR LEB., available at http://www.stl-
tsl.org/x/file/TheRegistry/Library/Cooperation/mou_otp-lebanon_en.pdf (last visited Apr. 17, 
2011). 
 75 Decision on Constitutionality, supra note 65, ¶ 50; see also Statute of the Special Tri-
bunal for Lebanon, supra note 12, art. 7 (specifically these courts may, ―enter into agree-
ments with States as may be necessary for the exercise of its functions and for the operation 
of the Special Court.‖). 
 76 See INT‘L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 25, at 35–36; see also Statute of 
the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, supra note 12. 
 77 See INT‘L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 25, at 37 (discussing the limita-
tions of enforcement powers for ―hybrid‖ tribunals). 
 78 Id. at 35–36. 
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on third party states apply to the entire tribunal resolution for the ICTY and 
ICTR. This is reflected by the use of the word ―shall‖ before the listing of 
the third party states obligations. For example, the ITCR statute states that 
under the Security Council Chapter VII powers: 
[A]ll States shall cooperate fully with the International Tribunal and its or-
gans in accordance with the present resolution and the Statute of the Inter-
national Tribunal and that consequently all States shall take any measures 
necessary under their domestic  law to implement the provisions of the 
present resolution and the Statute, including the obligation of States to 
comply with requests for assistance or orders issued by a Trial Chamber 
under Article 28 of the Statute, and requests States to keep the Secretary-
General informed of such measures.
79
 
Alternatively, when evaluating the wording used in the STL statute, 
it appears that Security Council Chapter VII enforcement powers apply only 
to the paragraph that established the STL within Resolution 1757, and to the 
paragraph that explains the Republic of Lebanon‘s compliance requirements 
when presented with requests by the STL. The first paragraph, with the use 
of the word shall, does not address the ability of the STL to require third 
party states to comply with the court‘s decisions and requests. This para-
graph states:  
1. Decides, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, 
 that: 
(a) The provisions of the annexed document, including its attachment, on 
 the establishment of a Special Tribunal for Lebanon shall enter into force 
 on 10 June 2007, unless the Government of Lebanon has provided  notifi-
cation under Article (1) of the annexed document before that date; 
(b) If the Secretary-General reports that the Headquarters Agreement has 
 not been concluded as envisioned under Article 8 of the annexed  docu-
ment, the location of the  seat of the Tribunal shall be determined in  con-
sultation with the Government of  Lebanon and be subject to the  con-
clusion of a Headquarters Agreement between the United Nations and  the 
State that hosts the Tribunal; 
(c) If the Secretary-General reports that contributions from the  Govern-
ment of Lebanon are not sufficient to bear the expenses described  in Ar-
ticle 5 (b) of the annexed document, he may accept or use voluntary con-
tributions from States to cover any shortfall.
80
 
Following the above paragraph in the STL‘s Establishment Resolu-
tion, the Security Council attached the previously created agreement be-
  
 79 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda para. 2, S.C. Res. 955, U.N. 
Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994) (emphasis added). 
 80 Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, supra note 12, at 2 (emphasis added). 
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tween the Council and Lebanon. In the Establishment Resolution, the re-
quirements for states to comply with the tribunals requests is discussed in 
Article 15 which states: 
1. The Government shall cooperate with all organs of the Special Tribun-
al, in particular with the Prosecutor and defense counsel, at all stages of 
the proceedings. It shall facilitate access of the Prosecutor and defense 
counsel to sites, persons and relevant documents required for the investiga-
tion. 
2. The Government shall comply without undue delay with any request 
for assistance by the Special Tribunal or an order issued by the Chambers, 
including, but not limited to:  
 
(a) Identification and location of persons;  
(b) Service of documents; 
(c) Arrest or detention of persons; 
(d) Transfer of an indictee to the Tribunal.
81
 
While the word shall is used, it is only used in reference to ―The 
Government,‖ meaning Lebanon.82 The cooperation of third party states is 
not addressed in the STL Agreement like it is in the agreements of the other 
Security Council mandated tribunals. This seems to suggest that the lan-
guage of the agreement only affords the Security Council‘s Chapter VII 
enforcement powers to the establishment of the tribunal, requiring the 
agreement for the STL be entered into force and with Lebanese cooperation, 
nothing further. 
Lack of enforcement powers may cause problems for the tribunal if 
it needs a nation to extradite their high-ranking state officials so that they 
may be tried before the tribunal. Lebanon is the only nation bound by Secu-
rity Council Resolution 1757 that is required to co-operate completely with 
requests of the STL.83 It is possible that third party states to the tribunal 
might choose not to carry out the requests of the court. Accordingly, al-
though the STL‘s mode of establishment vests authority to the court to do 
away with high ranking official immunities, problems may still arise con-
cerning completing arrests or achieving the surrenders of high ranking offi-
cials for trial. 
  
 81 Id. art. 15 (emphasis added). 
 82 See id. para. 4. 
 83 See id. art. 15. 
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2.  Presence of an explicit provision that eliminates high ranking offi-
cial immunities in the Special Tribunal for Lebanon‘s Statute 
The explicit powers granted to the STL through its statute to elimi-
nate head of state immunities is another reflection of the overall authority 
vested in the court when compared to other international tribunals. Prior to 
the STL, all international jurisdictions, including, the ICTY, ICTR, SCSL, 
the ECCC, and the ICC, included a provision in their statutes that explicitly 
eliminated Head of State and high-ranking state official immunity protec-
tions of the accused.84 This provision is derived from the Statute of the In-
ternational Military Tribunal (Nuremburg).85 Article 7 of the Nuremburg 
Charter is known as the ―Nuremburg Principle‖ and states that ―[t]he offi-
cial position of defendants, whether as Heads of State or responsible offi-
cials in Government Departments, shall not be considered as freeing them 
from responsibility or mitigating punishment.‖86 The Nuremburg Principle 
has since been restated in the 1946 Resolution of the General Assembly.87 
The 1946 Resolution affirmed the principles of international law recognized 
by both the entire charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal, and the Tribunal‘s 
final judgments.88 
The presence of the Nuremburg Provision in the charters of interna-
tional U.N.-created tribunals enforces the idea that individual responsibility 
should be required of accused high-ranking state officials before interna-
tional tribunals. Individual responsibility is established by barring immunity 
  
 84 See Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, S.C. Res. 
827, art. 7, UN SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., Annex, UN Doc. S/Res/827/Annex (May 25, 
1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1192, 1194 (―The official position of any accused person, 
whether as Head of State or Government or as a responsible Government official, shall not 
relieve such person of criminal responsibility. . .‖); see also Statute of the International Crim-
inal Tribunal for Rwanda, supra note 79, art. 6; see also Statute of the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone, supra note 51, art. 6. (The Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (2000) 
is annexed to this Agreement, available at http://www.scsl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=u 
Clnd1MJeEw%3d&tabid=176); see also Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary Cham-
bers in the Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period 
of Democratic Kampuchea art. 29; see also The Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9, art. 27(July 17, 1998)[hereinafter The Rome Statute]. 
 85 Aptel, supra note 7, at 1110–11. 
 86 Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the Eu-
ropean Axis, and Charter of the International Military Tribunal art. 7, Aug. 8, 1945, 58 Stat. 
1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 280. 
 87 ROSANNE VAN ALEBEEK, THE IMMUNITY OF STATES AND THEIR OFFICIALS IN 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 209 (Oxford Uni-
versity Press Inc., New York 2008). 
 88 Id. 
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from both prosecution and punishment of high-ranking state officials.89 Ar-
ticle 6 of the statute for the STL states that amnesty will not be a reason to 
bar prosecution for high-ranking officials; however, it mentions nothing 
about completely excluding state official immunities.90 This may have been 
done deliberately, with the intention of reserving the ability to eliminate 
state official immunity protections for only traditional stricto senso interna-
tional crimes.91 No traditional stricto senso crimes are being tried before the 
STL, however. The crimes of terrorism being tried at the STL are arguably 
so egregious that they should be considered stricto senso, and the issue will 
be addressed in a later portion of this Note.92 
Some commentators opine that the lack of a provision in the STL 
statute explicitly eliminating state official immunities grants high-ranking 
officials the immunities by default. However, the previous unfailing and 
frequent presence of an immunity-eliminating clause in prior ad-hoc and 
hybrid U.N.-created tribunals signifies a consensus in the international 
community that all international tribunals should be afforded the ability to 
eliminate immunities whether or not the tribunal is specifically afforded the 
right. Reflecting this trend, the Rome Statute of the ICC also eliminated all 
immunities for those individuals accused of all international crimes. Article 
27(1) of the Rome Statute states: 
This Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any distinction 
based on official capacity. In particular, official capacity as a Head of State 
or Government, a member of a Government or parliament, an elected rep-
resentative or a government official shall in no case exempt a person from 
criminal responsibility under this Statute.
93
  
In addition, Article VII of the International Law Commission‘s 
Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind further 
reflects the need for a universal elimination of high-ranking state official 
immunities when international crimes are committed.94 It states that ―[t]he 
official position of an individual who commits a crime against the peace and 
  
 89 Agreement for the Prosecution and of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, 
and Charter of the International Military Tribunal, supra note 86, art. 7. 
 90 Aptel, supra note 7, at 1108–11. 
 91 See supra Part II (including in the list of stricto senso crimes, genocide, war crimes, and 
crimes against humanity). 
 92 Aptel, supra note 7, at 1111; see also infra Part III.C.6.e. 
 93 The Rome Statute, supra note 84, art. 27(1). 
 94 Nsongurua J. Udombana, Pay Back Time in Sudan? Darfur in the International Crimi-
nal Court, 13 TULSA J. COMP. & INT‘L L. 1, 39–40 (2005)(explaining that although the Draft 
Code is not binding authority in international law it is authoritative in defining international 
customary law); see also Article 7 of the International Law Commission‘s (ILC‘s) Draft 
Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind (1996) [hereinafter ILC Draft 
Code]. 
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security of mankind, even if he acted as head of State or Government, does 
not relieve him of criminal responsibility or mitigate punishment.‖95  
The above consensus indicates that customary international law96 
now requires all individuals accused of committing the most heinous crimes 
to face justice before an international tribunal, regardless of the individual‘s 
official position.97 Appropriately, it was unnecessary for the drafters of the 
STL statute to include an explicit provision that excluded head of state im-
munities.98 The lack of an explicit provision in the STL does not reduce the 
authority vested to the tribunal by the international community to eliminate 
all high-ranking state official immunity protections of the accused.  
3.  The level of Security Council support for the creation of the Special 
Tribunal for Lebanon as exemplified through the Security Council 
voting record 
The level of support from the Security Council during the creation 
of the STL is also reflective of the implicit authority vested to it by the in-
ternational community.99 Five Security Council members abstained from 
voting on the adoption of Resolution 1757.100 It may be contested that the 
five abstentions reflect apprehensions that the Security Council is exceeding 
its authority, and interfering into strictly domestic Lebanese issues by insti-
tuting the STL. Additionally, some may view the voting record as proof the 
STL is not a legitimate international tribunal created from a Security Coun-
cil resolution with complete support. Specifically, critics may point out that 
in contrast to the STL, the ICTY is a truly legitimate tribunal, which was 
established through Resolution 827 under Chapter VII of the U.N. charter 
and by a unanimous vote in the Security Council.101 However, the Security 
  
 95 ILC Draft Code, supra note 94. 
 96 Customary international law norms are those principles which: (1) are broadly accepted 
by the international community and (2) require the legal obligations of enforcement from all 
nations. See Jerrold L. Mallory, Resolving the Confusion Over Head-of-State-Immunity: The 
Defined Rights of Kings, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 169, 176–77 (1986). 
 97 Mark A. Summers, Immunity of Impunity? The Potential Effect of Prosecutions of State 
Officials for Core International Crimes in States Like the United States that are Not Parties 
to the Statute of the International Criminal Court, 31 BROOK. J. INT‘L L. 463, 485–86 (2006) 
(referring to the most heinous stricto senso crimes). 
 98 Alebeek, supra note 87, at 209. 
 99 The Security Council must vote to establish a tribunal under its Chapter VII powers. See 
U.N. Charter, supra note 56, art. 39. 
100 U.N. SCOR, 62nd Sess., 5685th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.5685 (May 30, 2007). 
101 United Nations Bibliographic Information System, S.C. Res. 827 (1993) on 
establishment of the International Tribunal for Prosecution of Persons Responsible for 
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the 
Former Yugoslavia since 1991 (May 25, 1993) (stating that the United Nations voting record 
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Council also created other ―legitimate‖ international tribunals under its 
Chapter VII powers without achieving a unanimous Security Council vote. 
For example, the Security Council passed Resolution 955 creating the 
ICTR, even with one member voting against its creation and one abstain-
ing.102 It is arguable that the ICTR Security Council vote of no support, 
coupled with an abstention, is stronger evidence of the lack of Security 
Council agreement for the tribunal, than the five abstentions present in the 
creation of the STL.  
Critics will also likely point out that in addition to the five votes of 
abstention, the Security Council members, while voting, cautioned that the 
implementation of the STL could have serious political repercussions.103 
Despite these concerns, Resolution 1757 was pushed forward and legiti-
mately passed through the process required to bring the international tribun-
al into force, just as the ICTY and ICTR before it experienced. This com-
pliance with the process required for brining international tribunals into 
force, coupled with a complete affirmative Security Council vote from those 
members who did vote, enforces the claim that like the ICTY and the ICTR 
before it, the United Nations views the STL as a legitimate Security Council 
backed international tribunal.104 A further examination of the history behind 
the STL‘s creation aids in better defining the scope of authority vested in 
the STL. 
4.  The evolution of the events leading up to the establishment of the 
Special Tribunal for Lebanon by the United Nations 
The events leading up the establishment of the STL also contribute 
to the conclusion that the STL was intended to be an ―international‖ tribunal 
capable of eliminating state official immunity claims. First, in his letter to 
the Secretary-General of the United Nations (Secretary- General), which 
launched the process of creating the tribunal, the prime minster of Lebanon 
referred to the STL as a ―tribunal of an international character.‖105 The Se-
  
was Yes: 015, No: 000, Abstentions: 000, Non-Voting: 000, Total voting membership: 015), 






102 3377 Meeting Record, Security Council, The Situation Concerning Rwanda, S/PV.3377 
(May 16, 1994). 
103 U.N. SCOR 62nd Sess., supra note 100. 
104 Id. 
105 See generally Charge d‘affaires a.i.of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the U.N., 
Letter Dated December13, 2005 from the Charge d‘affaires a.i.of the Permanent Mission of 
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curity Council and the Secretary-General continued to refer to the STL as a 
―tribunal of an international character‖ in a range of other official docu-
ments and reports.106 For example, in a Report of the Secretary General to 
the Security Council, the Secretary-General specifically stated that a ―purely 
national tribunal‖ could not effectively prosecute those accused of the 
crimes in the STL‘s jurisdiction.107 However, in the report, the Secretary-
General also stressed that a purely ―international tribunal‖ would not assign 
the level of responsibility to Lebanon that is required to achieve justice for 
crimes that primarily affect the nation.108 The Secretary-General‘s report 
designated the tribunal as a hybrid form of court, but did little to clarify the 
scope of powers the STL—a court of ―international character‖— would 
possess. A further examination of the history of the Resolution 1757 leading 
to the court‘s creation aids in defining the court‘s designated authority. 
After reviewing the first Secretary-General report, the Security 
Council requested that the Secretary General negotiate with Lebanon for the 
establishment of a tribunal of ―international character.‖109 The Secretary-
General acted accordingly and published a second report that included the 
draft agreement between the United Nations and Lebanon for the STL.110 In 
this document, the Secretary-General directly addressed the concept of de-
veloping a ―tribunal of international character.‖111 The Secretary-General 
stated that although features of international character were not specifically 
discussed in the statute for the STL,  
The legal basis for the establishment of the special tribunal is an in-
ternational agreement between the United Nations and a Member State; its 
composition is mixed with a substantial international component; its stan-
dards of justice, including principles of due process of law, are those appli-
cable in all international or United Nations-based criminal jurisdictions; its 
rules of procedure and evidence are to be inspired, in part, by reference ma-
terials reflecting the highest standards of international criminal procedure; 
and its success may rely considerably on the cooperation of third States. 
  
Lebanon to the U.N. addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. S/2005/783 (Dec. 13, 
2005). 
106 Id. (proposing Lebanon should have a UN backed court that is an ―international or in-
ternationally assisted‖ tribunal based on an agreement between the United Nations and Leba-
non to try those individuals responsible for the Hairi assassination.). 
107 Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 1644 (2005) U.N. 
Doc. S/2006/176 (2006). 
108 Id. 
109 Schabas, supra note 23, at 515. 
110 Id. 
111 See generally Report of the Secretary-General on the establishment of a special tribunal 
for Lebanon U.N. Doc. S/2006/893 (2006) (first mentioned in para.2 but discussed through-
out the document). 
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While in all of these respects the special tribunal has international characte-
ristics, its subject matter jurisdiction or the applicable law remains national 
in character, however.112 
This statement emphasized the several attributes of the STL that 
mirror other international criminal tribunals. However, it also indicated that 
the subject matter of the tribunal and the applicable substantive law are na-
tional in character.113  
These combined events demonstrate the United Nation‘s belief that 
the authority vested to the STL is similar to other international U.N.-created 
tribunals. The following sections of this Note will evaluate how the STL‘s 
limited subject matter jurisdiction and applicable Lebanese law affects its 
ability to be considered ―international‖ enough to eliminate high-ranking 
state official immunity claims. Specifically, the sections below will address 
how the STL‘s ―international‖ characteristics outweigh the tribunals‘ ―na-
tional court‖ traits. Additionally, how the egregious nature of the crimes 
being tried by the STL will aid in tipping the scales to allow the tribunal to 
be considered ―international‖ enough to eliminate high-ranking state official 
immunity claims. 
C.  Characteristics of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon 
In addition to the ―international‖ level of authority vested in the 
STL, the ―characteristics‖ of the court reflect that the STL is an ―interna-
tional‖ tribunal capable of eliminating high-ranking official immunity 
claims. The characteristics of a court include: (1) its title; (2) the composi-
tion of its judges and staff; (3) its sources of funding; (4) its location; (5) the 
procedural methods used by the court; and (6) the courts subject matter ju-
risdiction.114 A comparison of the characteristics of the STL and other inter-
national U.N.-created tribunals must be completed to determine the level of 
―international‖ traits the STL possesses.115 
1.  Title of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon  
The first characteristic used to evaluate if the STL is international 
enough to eliminate high ranking state official immunities is the STL‘s title. 
Since several U.N.-sponsored criminal tribunals use the word ―internation-
  
112 Id. 
113 Schabas, supra note 23, at 516 (including in the subject matter terrorism, crimes and 
offences against life and personal integrity, illicit associations and failure to report crimes 
and offences and referring to the Lebanese Criminal Code as the substantive law used by the 
court). 
114 See generally INT‘L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 25, at 9-31(comparing 
and contrasting the STL to other international ad-hoc and hybrid tribunals). 
115 A visual comparison of the analysis in this section is available in Ann. 1. 
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al‖ in their title, some may argue the lack of this term in the STL‘s title in-
dicates it is not a truly international tribunal. Examples of U.N.-sponsored 
courts with ―international‖ in their titles include the ICJ, the ICC, the ICTY, 
and the ICTR.116  
In Prosecutor v. Taylor, a similar argument was brought before the 
Appeals Chamber of the SCSL, a U.N.-sponsored court which along with 
the ECCC, does not use ―international‖ in its title.117 In its overall decision, 
the Taylor Appeals Chamber attached little to no significance to distinctions 
in the titles of the tribunals when it analyzed those attributes, which make a 
tribunal ―international.‖118 The Taylor Court held that a ―Special Court‖ is 
equivalent in status to other U.N.-backed tribunals, even those that have the 
word ―international‖ in their title.119 Similarly, the STL uses the designation 
of ―special‖ in its title and was created by the United Nations. The lack of 
the term ―international‖ in the STL‘s title will not reduce the courts ability 
to be considered ―international‖ enough to eliminate head of state immuni-
ties. 
2.  Composition of the Judges Chambers Prosecutors, Registrar, and 
Defense Office in the Special Tribunal for Lebanon 
The second factor used to evaluate if the STL is a characteristically 
―international‖ tribunal is the composition of its judges, prosecutors, regi-
strar, and defense office. A comparison of the judicial composition of the 
STL reveals that it is similar to other U.N.-created hybrid tribunals. The 
STL statute requires its chambers to be composed of at least eleven inde-
pendent judges and no more than fourteen judges in total.120 Additionally, 
the judges in the STL Chambers must serve in the following capacities: (1) 
a single international judge as the Pre-Trial Judge; (2) three judges in the 
Trial Chamber, one who is Lebanese and two who are international; (3) in 
the event of the creation of a second Trial Chamber, that Chamber must be 
staffed in the same international to national ratio as the first defined Trial 
Chamber; (4) five judges must serve in the Appeals Chamber, including two 
Lebanese judges and three international judges; and (5) there must be two 
  
116 See Schabas, supra note 23, at 514. 
117 Id.; see also Decision on Immunity from Jurisdiction, supra note 64. 
118 The court looked to several factors but did not mention that the name had any signific-
ance in distinguishing an ―international‖ court from one that was not ―international.‖ See 
Decision on Immunity from Jurisdiction, supra note 64 (May 31, 2004); see also Schabas, 
supra note 23, at 514. 
119 Decision on Immunity from Jurisdiction, supra note 64, ¶ 42. 
120 This ensures that at least three-quarters of the judges in the Chambers of the STL are 
individuals from countries other than Lebanon. See Statute of the Special Tribunal for Leba-
non, supra note 12, art. 8. 
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alternate judges available at all times, one who is Lebanese and one who is 
international.121  
Some commentators argue that because the judicial staff (Cham-
bers) of the STL is not entirely international, the STL is not a characteristi-
cally international tribunal. These individuals claim that the ICTY and the 
ICTR ad-hoc tribunals are truly legitimate international courts, and that 
every judge composing the Chambers in the ICTY and ICTR are interna-
tional. However, the hybrid U.N.-created tribunals, the ECCC and SCSL,—
like the STL—do not have an entirely international Chambers. Yet these 
tribunals are considered international enough to eliminate head of state im-
munities.122 In the SCSL Chambers, the majority of the judges are interna-
tional, with the minority being from Sierra Leone.123 In the ECCC Cham-
bers, the majority of the judges are national and the minority is internation-
al.124 It is noteworthy that like the SCSL, the majority of judges in both the 
trial and appeals Chambers of the STL must be international. In addition, 
the STL Chambers employ more ―international‖ judges than the ECCC, and 
the STL‘s judicial composition mirrors the SCSL and ensures the STL is 
characteristically ―international.‖ 
Further comparisons of the STL‘s Registry, Prosecutor, and De-
fense offices to other U.N.-created international tribunals reveal that the 
STL is characteristically ―international‖ in these areas as well.125 There is no 
requirement that the STL‘s head register be a Lebanese national, but instead 
he must only be an international employee from the United Nations who is 
appointed by the Secretary-General.126 This is consistent with the selection 
methods of other U.N.-sponsored international tribunals, tribunals that must 
meet the needs of the international community. Alternatively, if the STL 
were a tribunal domestic in nature, a Lebanese registrar would be required 
to meet solely national Lebanese needs. 
A selection panel of individuals who were appointed by the Secre-
tary-General chose the STL‘s Prosecutor.127 The ECCC was the first tribun-
al to use the method of choosing a prosecutor through a panel, and the STL 
is the only tribunal to follow its example.128 Critics claim the selection of a 
  
121 Id. 
122 Johnson, supra note 5, at 275. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. 
125 See generally Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, supra note 12 (defining, 
throughout the different bodies of the tribunal and their functions). 
126 Id. art. 4. 
127 Id. art. 3.  
128 The STL panel included international judges, a U.N. Legal Counsel and the former 
president of the ICTR. INT‘L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 25, at 19. 
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prosecutor through a panel is not a transparent process.129 However, the use 
of a selection panel is designed to ensure the selection of a more impartial 
and professional tribunal staff occurs.130 Unlike the process of selecting the 
Prosecutor, the task of choosing STL‘s Deputy-Prosecutor was assigned to 
the Lebanese government.131 Commentators maintain that the presence of a 
national deputy prosecutor is evidence that the STL is not an international 
tribunal. Yet, a domestic deputy prosecutor was used in the ECCC and pro-
posed for usage at the SCSL.132 The characteristics the STL‘s prosecutors 
share with other legitimate international tribunals indicate that the STL‘s 
prosecutor selection process and composition is similar to other internation-
al tribunals. 
The Secretary-General, in consultation with the STL‘s President, 
Judge Antonio Cassese, appoints the head of the STL defense office.133 This 
selection process mirrors that used by other U.N. tribunals, however, the 
STL is the first U.N. tribunal to include the Defense Office as a fourth ―or-
gan‖ of the court.134 Under the STL statute, the STL defense office is af-
forded the same status as the Office of the Prosecutor, the Chambers, and 
the Registry.135 Including the Defense Office as an organ of the court en-
sures defendants will be afforded more access to court finances and re-
sources.136 Overall, the Defense Office is arguably more international in 
nature than the defense offices of other U.N.- backed tribunals because the 
office is included as an official organ of the court.  
3.  Funding sources for the Special Tribunal for Lebanon 
The funding scheme for the STL is the third characteristic that is 
weighed when determining if the tribunal is characteristically ―internation-
al‖ enough to eliminate head of state immunity protections. Unlike the ad-
hoc international tribunals, the STL is not funded by regular contributions to 
the United Nations, and it will not be required to report to the U.N. General 




131 Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, supra note 12, art. 3(3) (The Lebanese 
Government must consult the Secretary-General and the Prosecutor in their selection process 
for the deputy prosecutor). 
132 INT‘L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 25, at 22. 
133 See also Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, supra note 12, art. 13. 
134 See INT‘L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 25, at 24. 
135 Id. 
136 Id. 
137 See also Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, supra note 12, art. 5.  
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the U.N. Security Council and report directly to it.138 Accordingly, the same 
budget processes used in other established U.N. program activities are used 
to fund the ICTY and ICTR.139 Like other U.N. funded programs, every 
expense recorded by the ICTY and ICTR is reviewed and reimbursed by the 
member states of the United Nations collectively.140 Alternatively, the 
STL‘s funding scheme is similar to the funding systems used by the SCSL 
and the ECCC. The SCSL and the ECCC are funded by voluntary contribu-
tions of U.N. member states, and do not receive contributions from the gen-
eral U.N. budget.141 Fifty-one percent of the STL‘s funding will be by vo-
luntary contributions of U.N. member states, and forty-nine percent by the 
Lebanese government. Additionally, if the required amount of voluntary 
funding cannot be raised, the Security Council may explore other means of 
financing the STL‘s work.142 
Commentators claim that a tribunal, which receives forty-nine per-
cent of its monies from the Lebanese government, may run into problems if 
a change in power leads to the Lebanese government choosing to halt or 
undermine a large portion of the STL‘s funding.143 Although a change in 
power in the Lebanese government is a likely possibility, these criticisms 
are ultimately unfounded. Both the SCSL and the ECCC have experienced 
difficulties obtaining the required amount of funding to run the tribunals and 
have prevailed through support from other financial avenues.144 Faced with 
financial uncertainty, the SCSL previously requested and received funding 
from the U.N. general fund to minimize delays in the court.145 It is likely 
that the U.N. Security Council included a provision in the STL statute that 
allows the court to pursue alternate funding sources to allow for funding 
from the U.N. general fund to be used to support the tribunal if a stalemate 
occurs in the Lebanese government. The funding percentage set up may also 
be in place to allow other interested U.N. member donors to contribute to 
the STL‘s justice process if they become interested in the future.146 The STL 
funding scheme is similar to hybrid tribunals, and requiring Lebanon to 
  
138 Johnson, supra note 5, at 279. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. (A budgetary body in the General Assembly determines the exact percentage of the 
tribunal‘s reimbursement each member state must contribute). 
141 Id. 
142 Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, supra note 12, art. 5 (describing the financ-
ing of the Tribunal). 
143 AMNESTY INT‘L, THE SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR LEBANON: SELECTIVE JUSTICE? 7 (2009), 
available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/MDE18/001/2009. 
144 Johnson, supra note 5, at 280. 
145 Id. 
146 INT‘L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 25, at 15–16 (using similar reasoning 
for new member participation in the Management Committee). 
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contribute a set amount, while still allowing for flexibility in the funding 
percentage from donors, will ensure the tribunal does not face the same fi-
nancial difficulties that other voluntarily funded U.N. hybrid tribunals have 
faced. 
Critics also argue that the large contribution of funding to the STL 
by the Lebanese government reduces the accountability and impartiality of 
the court. Accordingly, Lebanese, not international, interests will largely 
guide prosecutions and convictions before the STL. However, like the 
SCSL, the STL has a Management Committee composed of major interna-
tional donors that provides policy advice and direction for the non-legal 
aspects of the court.147 This body ensures that the use of funding by the 
court reflects the needs of the international community that created the tri-
bunal.148 Current members of the STL Management Committee include the 
United Kingdom (the Committee chair); Germany; the Netherlands; the 
United States; France; and Lebanon.149 The Secretary-General also serves as 
an ex-officio member of the Committee, adding an additional degree of 
impartiality and international character to the STL.150  
The STL Management Committee is required to report on a regular 
basis to the ―Group of Interested States.‖151 The ―Group of Interested 
States‖ is an assembly of nations who are interested in the happenings of the 
STL, but may not necessarily support its work.152 Any U.N. member state 
concerned with the financial influence of the STL‘s funding scheme may 
join this group. The Management Committee may also expand its member 
composition if any additional donors wish to participate and the donor 
agrees to contribute a considerable amount of money to the tribunal.153 The 
funding system for the STL is very similar to the voluntary donor systems 
used by the ECCC and the SCSL, and although Lebanon is required to con-
tribute forty-nine percent of the funding for the tribunal, the accountability 
provided by the Management Committee will ensure that its funds are used 
to achieve impartial international justice. Ensuring the funding factor of the 
tribunal will remain more ―international‖ than national in character. 
 
  
147 Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, supra note 12, art. 6; see also INT‘L CTR. 
FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 25, at 15–16. 
148 INT‘L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 25, at 16. 
149 Id. at 15. 
150 Id. (stating that the Secretary-General does not vote on Management Committee Deci-
sions, but adds his advice to decisions and aids in overseeing the process). 
151 Id. 
152 Id. 
153 INT‘L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 25, at 15. 
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4.  Location of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon‘s headquarters and 
offices 
The location of the STL headquarters in The Hague, Netherlands is 
the fourth factor that indicates the tribunal is characteristically ―internation-
al‖ and able to eliminate high-ranking state official immunities. The prin-
cipal judicial organs of the United Nations, the ICJ and the ICC, are all lo-
cated in The Hague, Netherlands.154 The ICTY is also located in The Ha-
gue.155 The decision to place the ICTY in The Hague was influenced by the 
placement of the aforementioned judicial organs and the inability to effec-
tively run a court in a war torn nation.156 Like the ICTY, the ICTR was es-
tablished soon after a war and its main office is located outside of the nation 
where the crimes relevant to the tribunal occurred, in Arusha, Tanzania. 
However, the ICTR still staffs a field office in Kigali, Rwanda, and its ap-
peals chamber is located in The Hague.157 In contrast, the SCSL and the 
ECCC are located completely within the borders of the concerned countries 
with one exception.158 Even with an entirely domestically located court, the 
SCSL has found it necessary to try high profile cases in The Hague in the 
ICC‘s court room to ensure impartiality and safety of its participants.159 
The STL‘s location most resembles the ICTR, with its headquarters 
stationed outside of Lebanon in The Hague, Netherlands, and a field office 
located in Beirut, Lebanon.160 Article 8 of the Security Council Resolution 
for the STL states the tribunal shall specifically have its ―seat‖ outside of 
Lebanon to insure ―fairness, security and administrative efficiency.‖161 The 
tribunal consequently signed a ―headquarters agreement‖ with the Nether-
lands through the U.N. legal counsel to ensure the headquarters of the STL 
remains in The Hague throughout its existence.162  Although the STL has 
an office in Lebanon, the Security Council agreement to create the STL 
states that the purpose of the Lebanon office is only to further investiga-
  
154 Johnson, supra note 5, at 278. 
155 Id. 
156 Id.  
157 Id.  
158 Id. at 279 (noting that ―the trial of Charles Taylor in the Sierra Leone tribunal is being 
held in The Hague, not in Freetown, the site of the tribunal‖). 
159 Id. (Referring to the Charles Taylor case being held in The Hague, Netherlands.) 
160 INT‘L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, supra note 25, at 12; see also Agreement be-
tween the United Nations and the Kingdom of the Netherlands concerning the Headquarters 
of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, Dec. 21, 2007, available at http://www.stl-
tsl.org/sid/130 [hereinafter Headquarters Agreement]. 
161 See Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, supra note 12 (including upholding the 
rights of witnesses and victims). 
162 See generally Headquarters Agreement, supra note 160. 
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tions.163 It is necessary for international tribunals to keep the trials of high-
ranking officials with active supporters outside of the affected nation‘s bor-
ders for safety and security reasons. The need to conduct trials in a location 
outside of a nation was addressed during the Charles Taylor‘s trial at the 
SCSL.164 The decision to move Taylor‘s trial from Sierra Leone to The Ha-
gue occurred because the court was concerned that Taylor supporters in 
Sierra Leone would use violent means to delay Taylor‘s trial, or enable to 
the trial from occurring altogether.165 In addition to the Security Council 
explicitly designating the Hague as the Special Tribunal for Lebanon‘s 
―seat‖ for conducting trials166, potential tensions in Lebanon during the pro-
ceedings may disable the court from completing its assigned tasks, if trials 
were be held inside Lebanese borders. Both of these factors suggest STL 
trials will never be conducted in Lebanon. Accordingly, the location of the 
court further lends to the STL‘s ―international‖ characteristics.  
5.  Procedural methods used by the Special Tribunal for Lebanon 
The fifth factor that makes the STL more international than domes-
tic in nature are the STL‘s procedural methods. All of the U.N.-created tri-
bunals listed in the visual comparison Annex section of this Note use proce-
dural laws very similar to the STL. Each tribunal‘s procedural laws are 
based on the international standards of justice and due process inspired by 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.167 Although the 
STL is the first U.N.- backed international tribunal to apply only domestic 
law, the procedural rules of the tribunal are required to replicate internation-
al standards of justice and due process.168 This factor weighs favorably in 
the determination that the STL is an international tribunal capable of elimi-
nating head of state immunities. 
When comparing STL to other U.N.-created tribunals, it is evident 
that the aforementioned five characteristics of the STL are very similar to 
other U.N.-created tribunals before it. The traits of the STL, as discussed 
above will not likely give rise to concerns that characteristically it is not an 
international tribunal. However, the sixth characteristic, the subject matter 
  
163 Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, supra note 12, art. 8, ¶ 3. 
164 Johnson, supra note 5, at 275. 
165 Id. (―While other trials conducted by the United Nations-backed Special Court for Sier-
ra Leone, SCSL, have taken place in Freetown, the court is trying Taylor at the premises of 
the International Criminal Court, ICC, in The Hague. The decision to locate the trial in The 
Hague was taken in the interests of keeping the peace in Sierra Leone and the wider re-
gion.‖). 
166 See Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, supra note 12 (including upholding the 
rights of witnesses and victims). 
167 Johnson, supra note 5, at 278. 
168 Id.; see generally Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, supra note 12. 
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jurisdiction of the court, may become a seriously contested factor in deter-
mining if the STL is an international criminal tribunal capable of eliminat-
ing immunity claims of the accused. 
6.  Subject matter jurisdiction for the Special Tribunal of Lebanon 
The subject matter jurisdiction of a court is also evaluated to deter-
mine if the tribunal has the ability to prosecute crimes similar to other inter-
national tribunals, and is therefore intrinsically ―international.‖169 The STL 
may be characteristically similar to a hybrid tribunal, however, the scope of 
its subject matter jurisdiction is unlike any previous U.N.-created interna-
tional tribunal.170 The STL‘s jurisdiction covers crimes defined only by a 
domestic source, the Lebanese Penal Code (LPC).171 Additionally, the tri-
bunal is trying no traditional ―international‖ crimes under the LPC.172 In-
cluded in the jurisdiction of the STL are: acts of terrorism; crimes, and of-
fenses against life and personal integrity; illicit associations; and failure to 
report crimes and offenses defined under the LPC.173  
Like the STL, SCSL and the ECCC have jurisdiction over domestic 
crimes.174 However, in addition to their domestic subject matter jurisdiction, 
the SCSL and the ECCC also have jurisdiction over international crimes.175 
No international court decision has directly addressed the question of 
whether a U.N.-created tribunal only prosecuting non-universally recog-
nized ―international‖ crimes could be one that has the power to eliminate 
claims of immunity.176 In the Arrest Warrant Case, the ICJ stated it is ―too 
new to admit of any definite answer‖ on what exactly what constitutes an 
―international court.‖177  
  
169 Schabas, supra note 23, at 516–17. 
170 Id. at 517. 
171 Id. at 519; see also Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, supra note 12, art. 2. 
172 Schabas, supra note 23, at 517. 
173 See generally Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, supra note 12. 
174 Nidal Nabil Jurdi, The Subject-Matter Jurisdiction of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, 
5 J. INT‘L CRIM. JUST. 1125, 1126 (2007); see also Johnson, supra note 5, at 277–78 (the 
SCSL does have subject matter jurisdiction over domestic crimes, but actual SCSL prosecu-
tions focus on crimes against humanity, violations of Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions 
and of Additional Protocol II, and other serious violations of international humanitarian Law. 
The domestic subject-matter jurisdiction of the SCSL has played a very small role in the 
court‘s trials). 
175 See Johnson, supra note 5, at 278 (the ECCC and the SCSL are a part of the their na-
tions domestic court system. In contrast, the STL is a judicial body independent from the 
Lebanese legal system). 
176 See Schabas, supra note 23, at 516 (referring to the reference by the court of ―certain 
international criminal courts‖ capable of eliminating high-ranking state official immunities). 
177 See Arrest Warrant, supra note 31 (dissenting opinion of Judge Oda, ¶ 14). 
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The STL‘s lack of jurisdictional power over international crimes 
may create problems for the STL‘s Office of the Prosecutor because high-
ranking state official immunities have not historically been waived for indi-
viduals that commit domestic crimes.178 Critics claim that defining the STL 
as an international tribunal impedes on the sovereign rights of nations be-
cause the STL subject matter jurisdiction is solely domestic. However, 
Judge Christine van den Wyngaert‘s dissent in the Arrest Warrant Case 
supports the concept that allowing characteristically hybrid tribunals like the 
STL to exercise universal jurisdiction and eliminate state official immuni-
ties is valid.179 Van den Wyngaret stated that eliminating high-ranking state 
official immunities is valid if doing so ensures ―the whole recent movement 
in modern international criminal law towards recognition of the principle of 
individual accountability for international crimes‖ is not ignored.180 This is 
especially important for the STL, where the accused before the tribunal may 
be current or former high-ranking state officials who may be afforded com-
plete immunity if it is held the tribunal is inherently domestic and not ―in-
ternational.‖ However, emerging trends in international law suggest that the 
acts of terrorism being tried before the STL are international in nature. Ac-
cordingly the tribunal is ―international‖ enough to eliminate claims of high-
ranking official immunities. 
a.  Terrorism defined under the Lebanese Penal Code 
The portions of the LPC included in the subject matter jurisdiction 
of the STL are those ―relating to the prosecution and punishment of acts of 
terrorism, crimes and offences life and personal integrity, illicit associations 
and failure to report crimes and offences, including the rules regarding the 
material elements of a crime, criminal participation and conspiracy.‖181 The 
portion of the LPC that defines terrorist acts explains that they are those 
activities ―intended to create a state of panic committed by using such 
means as explosives, inflammable materials, toxic or incendiary products, 
and infectious and microbial agents that cause public danger.‖182 Hariri‘s 
assassination was committed with explosives, and the attack will be consi-
  
178 See Summers, supra note 97, at 486–89. 
179 See Schabas, supra note 23, at 516. 
180 See Arrest Warrant, supra note 31 (dissenting opinion of Justice Van den Wyngaret, ¶ 
27) (although she notes a narrow approach is often taken in respect to immunity protections). 
181 Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, supra note 12, art. 2; see also Jurdi, supra 
note 174, at 1129 (specifically Articles 270, 271, 314, 335, 547, 548, and 549 of the LPC and 
Articles 2, 4, 5, and 6 of the Law dated January 11, 1958). 
182 Issam Michael Saliba, International Tribunals, National Crimes and the Hariri assassi-
nation: A Novel Development in International Criminal Law, THE LAW LIBRARY OF 
CONGRESS 5 (2007) (citing Legislative Decree 340 of 1943 (Leb.), art. 314), available at 
http://www.loc.gov/law/help/hariri/hariri.pdf. 
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dered an act of terrorism under the LPC if it can be proven that the accused 
intended to create a state of fear among the Lebanese public.183 Assuming 
the Hariri assassination was an act of terrorism as defined by the LPC, the 
STL will be considered international enough to eliminate head of state im-
munities if the assassination is classified as an international crime, either 
independently or under the broader subset of crimes against humanity. 
b.  Terrorism as an independent international crime defined by a treaty 
or through customary international law 
A crime may be defined as ―international‖ either because a treaty 
labels it as such, or because it is universally accepted as ―international‖ 
through customary international law.184 As previously mentioned in the ―A 
Historical Development of International Criminal Tribunals‖ Part II.A of 
this Note there are currently three widely recognized ―international‖ or 
stricto senso international crimes: genocide, war crimes, and crimes against 
humanity.185 The crimes being tried before the STL include: terrorist acts, 
crimes of illicit association, and offenses against life and personal integrity. 
Such crimes are generally not considered part of the historic list of stricto 
senso crimes.186 However, an international trend is emerging that suggests 
terrorism should also be included on the list of stricto senso crimes. This 
coupled with a recent STL appeals chamber decision suggests that crimes of 
terrorism will be ―international‖ crimes before the Special Tribunal for Leb-
anon.187 
c.  Terrorism - an international crime as defined by treaties  
In addition to the universal jurisdiction granted to stricto senso 
crimes, treaties authorize universal jurisdiction over further offenses. 
Crimes that are granted universal jurisdiction by treaties include: torture, 
hostage apprehension, and hijacking transgressions.188 The grant of univer-
sal jurisdiction by treaties indicates that perpetrators of treaty-defined 
crimes are ―enemies of mankind‖ and are condemned by the international 
  
183 Id. (for a further discussion of how the Hariri attack created a state of fear among the 
Lebanese Population See infra Part III.C.6.e). 
184 Schabas, supra note 23, at 517.  
185 Aptel, supra note 7, at 1111; See supra Part II.A. 
186 Id. (as defined by the Lebanese criminal code). 
187 Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy, Homicide, Per-
petration, Cumulative Charging, Case No. STL-11-01/I (Feb. 16, 2011), available at 
http://www.stl-tsl.org/x/file/TheRegistry/Library/CaseFiles/chambers/20110216_STL-11-
01_R176bis_F0010_AC_Interlocutory_Decision_Filed_EN.pdf [hereinafter Interlocutory 
Decision]. 
188 Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 8, at 2134. 
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community.189 In addition to the crimes of torture, hostage apprehension, 
and hijacking defined by treaties, several conventions and treaties exist that 
grant nations jurisdiction for crimes of terrorism. 
International support through treaties for combating acts of terror-
ism began in 1926 when the International Congress of Penal Law recom-
mended a Permanent Court of International Justice should be granted the 
power to ―judge individual liabilities‖ that occur as a result of international 
offenses which are ―a threat to world peace.‖190 Although this idea died, and 
there currently is no universally recognized definition for terrorism,191 simi-
lar requests to include certain acts of terrorism as international crimes have 
been expressed in the international forum.192  
One example occurred in 1994, when the U.N. General Assembly 
passed a Resolution named ―Measures to Eliminate International Terror-
ism.‖193 This Resolution provided a general definition of terrorism and 
stated: 
Criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the gen-
eral public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes 
are in any circumstance unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a po-
litical, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or any other na-
ture that may be invoked to justify them.
194
 
In the preface to this Resolution, the U.N Secretary General, Kofi 
Annan, emphasized how important it is for the international community to 
  
189 Id. at 2133–34. 
190 SCHARF & NEWTON, supra note 10 (citing Voeau of the International Congress of Penal 
Law Concerning an International Criminal Court (Brussels, 1926), reprinted in Historical 
Survey of the Question of International Criminal Jurisdiction, Memorandum Submitted by 
the Secretary-General 74, UN Doc. A/CN.4/7Rev.1 (1949) (translating the original French 
text found in Premier congres international de droit penal, Actes du congres 634)). 
191 Kevin J. Greene, Terrorism as Impermissible Political Violence: An International Law 
Framework, 16 VT. L. REV. 461, 462 (l992) (―Terrorism has ‗no precise or widely accepted 
definition.‘‖). 
192 Id. (These requests have occurred on several occasions. One suggestion came from the 
French government to the League of Nations that the ICC would be the best forum for trying 
political crimes of an international nature, and an international convention on the suppression 
of terrorism should be created to initiate the process. In 1937, a Conference for the Repres-
sion of Terrorism met and collaborated to adopt a Convention of an International Criminal 
Court to address terrorist acts. Although this treaty was rejected the idea before it was rati-
fied, every multilateral anti-terrorism convention adopted since has adhered to the pattern 
used by the Conference and has defined specific terrorist acts as violations of international 
law.). 
193 SCHARF & NEWTON, supra note 10. 
194 Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, G.A. Res. 49/60, (Dec. 9 1994), para. I.3 
[hereinafter Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism]. 
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try acts of terrorism.195 Additionally, it appears from the ―Measures to Elim-
inate International Terrorism‖ Resolution that the U.N. General Assembly 
believes that to properly combat terrorist acts, universal jurisdiction must be 
provided over terrorist criminals regardless of their position.196 The Security 
Council again deplored acts of terrorism in Resolution 1373 on the interna-
tional cooperation to combat threats to international peace and security 
caused by terrorist acts. The resolution condemns international acts of ter-
rorism and reinforces the idea that acts of terrorism constitute a threat to 
―international peace and security.‖197 
Currently, several multilateral anti-terrorism conventions exist that 
focus on the domestic enforcement of terrorism through international coop-
eration.198 Additionally, acts of transnational terrorism, like the Hariri assas-
sination, are becoming a serious problem.199 Accordingly, defining terror-
ism as an international crime in an effort to bring offenders to justice is now 
a priority in nations across the globe.200 However, none of the mentioned 
conventions specifically refer to terrorism as an international criminal of-
fense.201 Although terrorism is not explicitly defined as an international 
crime through treaties, the international condemnation of terrorist crimes 
described above suggests a trend in customary international law is emerging 
that defines certain egregious acts of terrorism as international crimes. 
d.  Terrorism as defined through customary international law 
As previously mentioned, principles that are considered customary 
international law are those which are broadly accepted by the international 
community, and require the legal obligations of enforcement from all na-
tions.202 Combating grave crimes through customary international law re-
flects the international community‘s interest in protecting higher norms of 
justice when these norms come into conflict with the rules of state official 
  
195 Id. at Preface. 
196 Id. at I.1-2 (stating ―the methods and practices of terrorism [are] criminal and unjustifi-
able-whoever commits them and wherever they occur.‖) 
197 See U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 438th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001) (con-
ferring about states‘ obligations to combat terrorism). 
198 Greene, supra note 191, at 467–71 (included but not limited to the European Conven-
tion on the Suppression of Terrorism, the Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts 
Committed on Board Aircraft, the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against 
the Safety of Civil Aviation, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes 
Against Internationally Protected Persons, and the Convention Against the Taking of Hos-
tages.). 
199 SCHARF & NEWTON, supra note 10. 
200 Id. 
201 Saliba, supra note 182, at 5. 
202 See Mallory, supra note 96, at 176–77. 
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immunity.203 Part III.C.6.c of this Note provided several examples of when 
the international community accepted the need to combat terrorism.204 In 
addition, the U.N. General Assembly stated ―any acts of terrorism are crim-
inal and unjustifiable regardless of motivation, whenever and by whom-
soever committed and are unequivocally condemned.‖205 There were also 
proposals to include terrorist crimes in the ICC statute.206 Currently, the 
Security Council requires member nations of the United Nations to ―accept 
and carry out‖ resolutions that combat ―terrorism,‖ but have yet to define 
what those terms mean.207  
A few national courts have also recently expressed support for an 
exception to state official immunity protections when crimes are so egre-
gious that not prosecuting the individuals allegedly responsible would vi-
olate widely understood norms of justice.208 These domestic court cases 
lend support to the ability to define terrorism as a stricto senso international 
crime. Included in these national cases is a case from the United States, Si-
derman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, the United States 9th Circuit 
Court of Appeals held that international law does not recognize an act of 
torture as a sovereign act with immunity protections.209 However, critics 
may point to the Qaddafi case210 and claim that unlike the torture in the Si-
derman case, the Hariri attack, which took the lives of 22 individuals by car 
bomb, is not extreme enough to be defined as ―international.‖  
In the Qaddafi case, the leader of Liberia, Muammar Qaddafi (Qad-
dafi), was sued in France for his government‘s participation in a terrorist 
  
203 See generally Arrest Warrant, supra note 32. 
204 See supra Part III.C.6.c. 
205 Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, supra note 194.  
206 Schabas, supra note 23, at 520. 
207 SCHARF & NEWTON, supra note 10. 
208 See Erika de Wet, The Prohibition of Torture as an International Norm of Jus Cogens 
and its Implications for National and Customary Law, 15 EUR. J. INT‘L L. 97, 106 (2004) 
(including other cases where sovereign immunity has been dissolved for especially heinous 
crimes. In Prefecture of Voiotia v. Federal Republic of Germany, a Greek court upheld a 
compensation claim against Germany for the massacre of 218 civilians and the destruction of 
their property by members of the S.S. in June 1944); see also Pasquale De Sena & Francesca 
De Vittor, State Immunity and Human Rights: The Italian Supreme Court Decision on the 
Ferrini Case, 16 EUR. J. INT‘L L. 89 (2005) (where an Italian court in Ferrini v. Federal 
Republic of Germany upheld an Italian citizen‘s claim against German government officials 
for an incident where he was captured by German troops in the province of Arezzo and de-
ported to Germany where he was forced to work for the war industry, considering this a war 
crime). 
209 Siderman de Blake v. Republic of n11/dc10.htm.Argentina, 965 F.2d 699 (1992).  
210 See generally Gaddafi Case, Cour de cassation [Cass.][supreme court for judicial mat-
ters] crim., Mar. 13, 2001, 125 I.L.R. 490 (Fr.). 
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bombing.211 The attack, which was claimed to be lead by the Liberian Gov-
ernment, resulted in the crash of a French UTA aircraft over Africa, and the 
loss of the 171 lives.212 The court held that no matter how severe Qaddafi‘s 
terrorist charge was, the act did not fall into one of the exceptions to im-
munity claims for current foreign Heads of State.213 However, the court in 
its decision failed to give any explanation to why terrorism is not an interna-
tional crime.214 The lack of reasoning behind the court‘s decision reduces 
the weight of this case when used to determine if universal jurisdiction 
should be provided to try egregious acts of terrorism. Apart from of the 
Qaddafi case, a general trend towards expanding the traditional list of stric-
to senso crimes to include additional grave offenses such as torture and par-
ticularly abhorrent acts of terrorism is emerging in national courts. 
The obiter dictum of a recent unanimous Interlocutory Decision by 
the STL‘s Appellate Chamber supports the trend of categorizing terrorism 
as a stricto senso crime, and suggests that the Hariri assassination may be 
considered an ―international‖ act of terrorism before the Special Tribunal 
for Lebanon, removing any immunity protections it‘s perpetrators would 
have otherwise been afforded.215 The STL Statute dictates that the STL 
Chambers shall define crimes of terrorism using domestic Lebanese law.216 
However, the STL Appeals Chamber in the February 2011 Interlocutory 
Decision stated that the STL Justices may read the Lebanese law contained 
in the subject matter jurisdiction of the tribunal in the context of ―interna-
tional obligations undertaken by Lebanon with which, in the absence of 
very clear language, it is presumed any legislation complies.‖217  
In the decision, the STL court also stated that although some critics 
claim otherwise, terrorism is a crime defined under international law, and 
this is reflected in the current widely accepted customary definition of ter-
rorism, which is drawn from state practice and opino juris.218 The STL In-
  
211 Salvatore Zappalà, Do Heads of State in Office Enjoy Immunity from Jurisdiction for 
International Crimes? The Ghaddafi Case Before the French Cour de Cassation, 12 EUR. J. 
INT‘L L. 595, 595–96 (2001) (specifically charged with murder for complicity in a terrorist 
act); see also id. 
212 Id.; see also Gaddafi Case, supra note 210. 
213 Id. at 596; see also Gaddafi Case, supra note 210. 
214 Id. at 598; see also Gaddafi Case, supra note 210. 
215 Interlocutory Decision, supra note 187. 
216 Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, supra note 12, art. 1. 
217 Interlocutory Decision, supra note 187, ¶¶ 19–20; see also Michael Scharf, Special 
Tribunal for Lebanon Issues Landmark Ruling on Definition of Terrorism and Modes of 
Participation, 15 ASIL Insights (March 4, 2011), http://www.asil.org/insights110304.cfm# 
_ednref5 (last visited Apr. 17, 2011). 
218 See Interlocutory Decision, supra note 187, ¶¶ 83, 102 (stating that, ―although it is held 
by many scholars and other legal experts that no widely accepted definition of terrorism has 
evolved in the world society because of the marked difference of views on some issues, 
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terlocutory Decision marks the first time that an international tribunal dis-
tinctly established a universal definition of terrorism under international 
law,219 and the Decision set out three elements in this new ―customary law‖ 
definition of terrorism: 
(i) the perpetration of a criminal act (such as murder, kidnapping, hostage-
taking, arson, and so on), or threatening such an act; (ii) the intent to 
spread fear among the population (which would generally entail the crea-
tion of public danger) or directly or indirectly coerce a national or interna-
tional authority to take some action, or to refrain from taking it; (iii) when 
the act involves a transnational element.
220
 
When applying the facts of the Hariri assassination to the customary 
international law definition of terrorism provided in the Interlocutory Deci-
sion, it appears that the car bombing that took the life of Rafiq Hariri and 22 
others satisfies the first element of the definition, which requires the ―perpe-
tration of a criminal act‖.221 Additionally, that the first option of the second 
element of the definition, requiring the intent of the perpetrators to be the 
creation fear among the population, will likely be satisfied. Specifically, 
because the car bomb resulted in the death of 22 individuals in addition to 
Hariri, and this causality toll could possibly be considered the creation of a 
―public danger.‖222 The court held that the means of attack used in crimes 
being tried before the STL need not be evaluated when deciding if an attack 
is considered terrorism or murder under the STL‘s jurisdiction.223 This will 
provide the court expansive discretion when determining if crimes under the 
STL‘s jurisdiction meet the first option of the second element. Specifically, 
because the holding now allows those crimes committed using rifles or 
handguns which that at first glance appear do not cause a danger to the gen-
eral population, to meet the first option of the second element. Something 
that is contrary to domestic Lebanese case law defining terrorism.224  
Alternatively, the second option of the second element may be satis-
fied under this definition if the perpetrators intended to use the attack to 
  
closer scrutiny reveals that in fact such a definition has gradually emerged.‖); see also 
Scharf, supra note 217. 
219 Scharf, supra note 217. 
220 Interlocutory Decision, supra note 187, ¶ 85.  
221 Id. 
222 See id. (stating that the first option of the second element would generally entail the 
creation of a public danger); see also generally, Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, 
supra note 12 (describing how the Hariri Assassination took the life of Rafiq Hariri and 22 
others). 
223 Interlocutory Decision, supra note 187, ¶ 147; see also Scharf, supra note 217. 
224 Interlocutory Decision, supra note 187, ¶¶ 59, 138, 145; see also Scharf, supra note 
217.  
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directly or indirectly coerce the Lebanese Government to take some form of 
action.225 The actual intent of the perpetrators as required in both options of 
element two ultimately would only be determined when evidence is pro-
duced at trial. Finally, the third element of the ―international‖ terrorism de-
finition expressed by the Interlocutory Decision requires that the Hariri as-
sassination involved a transnational element.226 The ability of the Hariri 
attack to meet this element, like the second element if the definition, is 
something that will only be determined after the production of evidence at 
trial.  
Additionally, although it appears that the STL Appellate Chamber 
through the Interlocutory Decision confirmed a general definition of terror-
ism under international law,227 the extent that the Chamber will read the 
Lebanese Law in the context of the customary international law definition 
of terrorism for the Hariri attack, will only be determined by subsequent 
STL jurisprudence.228  
Even if the Hariri act of terrorism does not fall into the customary 
international law definition of terrorism created by the STL Chambers in the 
Interlocutory Decision, some acts of terrorism may also be considered inter-
national crimes against humanity. This categorization occurs because the 
acts of terrorism are intrinsically grave and have particularly odious conse-
quences on the lives and assets of innocent civilians. 
e.  The Hariri assassination: Can terrorism be considered a crime 
against humanity? 
While the STL does not explicitly include crimes against humanity 
in its subject matter jurisdiction, certain egregious acts of terrorism, like the 
Hariri assassination, can be categorized as a crime against humanity under 
the category of ―other inhumane acts‖ and should be considered stricto sen-
so international crimes that are not afforded immunity protections.229 In 
Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galic, the ICTY held that ―the prohibition against 
terror is a specific prohibition within the general prohibition of attack on 
civilians. [The latter of which constitutes a] peremptory norm of customary 
international law.‖230 This holding supports the idea that singular acts of 
  
225 Interlocutory Decision, supra note 187, ¶¶ 59, 138, 145; see also Scharf, supra note 
217. 
226 Interlocutory Decision, supra note 187, ¶ 85. 
227 Scharf, supra note 217. 
228 Interlocutory Decision, supra note 187, ¶¶ 19–20. 
229 See generally Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, supra note 12 (the term 
―Crimes Against Humanity‖ is never explicitly used); see also SCHARF & NEWTON, supra 
note 10.  
230 Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgment and Opinion, ¶ 98 (Int‘l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 5, 2003), available at http://www.icty.org/x/ 
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terrorism which are a part of a greater widespread systematic attack on a 
civilian population may be considered crimes against humanity.  
In order for the Hariri assassination to be considered a crime against 
humanity, it must have been part of a greater set of criminal acts that when 
taken together equate to (1) a ―widespread or systematic‖ attack that is (2) 
―directed against [a] civilian population.‖231 The established international 
jurisprudence considers a ―widespread attack‖ as one directed against a 
multiplicity of victims. In contrast, the term ―systematic attack‖ has a higher 
threshold and for acts to fall under the definition of a ―systematic attack,‖ 
the crimes must be orchestrated by virtue of a preconceived plan or poli-
cy.232 The policy does not have to be adopted formally as the policy of a 
state, but there must exist some kind of preconceived plan or policy for ter-
ror or violence at a high level of state politics.233 
It is not clear whether the Hariri assassination was part of a larger 
widespread ―systematic attack.‖ In any case, this attack could only be quali-
fied as such if it is proven that it was directed against the Lebanese people 
as part of a larger political policy of repression and fear. 
  
cases/galic/tjug/en/gal-tj031205e.pdf. 
231 Id. ¶¶ 40–48; see also Rome Statue, supra note 84 (listing the following as crimes 
against humanity and proffering internationally accepted definitions of key terms within the 
specified offenses: murder; extermination; enslavement; deportation or forcible transfer of 
population; imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fun-
damental rules of international law; torture; rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution forced 
pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravi-
ty; persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, 
ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in paragraph 3, or other grounds that are univer-
sally recognized as impermissible under international law, in connection with any act re-
ferred to in this paragraph or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court; enforced disap-
pearance of persons; the crime of apartheid; other inhumane acts of a similar character inten-
tionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health); see 
also Agreement for the Prosecution and of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, 
and Charter of the International Military Tribunal, supra note 86 (defining ―crimes against 
humanity‖ as ―murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts 
committed against any civilian population, before or during the war, or persecutions on polit-
ical, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country 
where perpetrated‖). 
232 Vincent-Joël Proulx, Rethinking the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court in 
the Post-September 11th Era: Should Acts of Terrorism Qualify as Crimes Against Humanity, 
19 AM. U. INT‘L L. REV. 1009, 1071–72 (2004) (the Akayesu decision defined the concept of 
―widespread,‖ stating that it is ―massive, frequent, large scale action, carried out collectively 
with considerable seriousness and directed against a multiplicity of victims.‖ The court stated 
that a systematic crime ―is thoroughly organized and following a regular pattern on the basis 
of a common policy involving substantial public or private resources‖). 
233 Id. at 273–74 (noting that even classified terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda could be held 
responsible for crimes against humanity). 
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A set of factors can be used to determine if the Hariri assassination 
truly was ―systematic in nature.‖ The factors established by international 
jurisprudence include: (1) The existence of a underlying policy of terror that 
targets a specific community as defined by the scale or the repeated, un-
changing, and continuous nature of violence committed against a particular 
civilian population; (2) the creation of specific institutions to implement the 
policy of terror; (3) an extensive level of involvement of high-level political 
or military authorities in the underlying plan and the specific attack; and (4) 
the employment of considerable financial, military, or other resources to 
implement the policy and attack.234  
Individuals responsible for the Hariri attack may argue that the 
bombing was not part of a systematic attack on the civilian population of 
Lebanon, but was, for example, an isolated political event. They may also 
additionally argue that the ICTY—a truly international tribunal—requires 
that crimes against humanity must take place in ―armed conflict.‖235 How-
ever, the U.N. Secretary General states in his report on the ICTY statute that 
crimes against humanity are ―prohibited regardless of whether they are 
committed in an armed conflict, international or internal in character.‖236 
This statement supports the idea that no matter the surrounding circums-
tance, acts that meet a certain level of atrocity should be considered crimes 
against humanity. The report also observes that inhumane acts have to be 
―committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian 
population on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds,‖237 
countering any argument that a political attack cannot be considered a crime 
against humanity. 
The ICTY supported the ideas expressed in the U.N. Secretary 
General‘s report in the Galic holding. In Galic, the ICTY held that an attack 
that is expressly intended to provoke terror in the civilian population or the 
  
234 Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisić, Case No. IT-95-10-T, Judgment, ¶ 53 (Dec. 14 1999). The 
ICTY defined four factors used to determine the systematic character of an attack: (1) the 
existence of a political objective; (2) a plan pursuant to which the attack is perpetrated or an 
ideology behind the attack to destroy, persecute or weaken a community; (3) the undertaking 
of a criminal act on a very large scale against a group of civilians or the repeated and conti-
nuous commission of inhumane acts linked to one another; (4) the preparation and use of 
significant public or private resources, whether military or other; the implication of high-
level political and/or military authorities in the definition and establishment of the methodi-
cal plan. 
235 Statute for the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, supra note 
84, at 5 (enumerating the crimes of murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, impri-
sonment, torture, rape, persecutions on political, racial, and religious grounds, and other 
inhumane acts for which the Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute). 
236 U.N. Secretary-General, Rep. of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of 
Security Council Resolution 808, ¶ 47, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993). 
237 Id. ¶ 48. 
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political structure of a nation does not comport with the laws and customs of 
war, and is a crime against humanity.238 The ICTR likewise echoed this 
sentiment in the Akayesu. In Akayesu, the ICTR stated that acts of violence 
intended to create terror in the civilian population are crimes against human-
ity and do not require special intent.239 Specifically, these types of acts ―are 
prohibited regardless of whether they are committed in an armed conflict, 
international or internal in character.‖240 The violent car bomb attack that 
took the life of the Lebanese public figure former Prime Minister Hariri, 
may be considered part of a greater scheme of attacks that were meant to 
provoke terror both in the Lebanese civilian population and in the Lebanese 
political scheme. 241 In addition, several Lebanese journalists who are public 
figures in the nation, amongst other victims of targeted and non-targeted 
attacks that occurred in Lebanon, have been maimed or murdered in at-
tacks.242 According to certain sources, these journalists were known for 
supporting Lebanese independence through their journalistic mediums.243 
The resulting feelings from these attacks may also have contributed to creat-
ing widespread fear and self-censorship among journalists and Lebanese 
citizens.244 Former Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora expressed to 
global news outlets that ―there is no doubt‖ that the attacks on the journal-
ists and others are related in some manner to the Hariri assassination.245 
Although crimes against humanity are not an explicit charge pro-
vided for in the STL statute, it appears that the Hariri terrorist attack may 
possess several of the characteristics required for this form of international 
crime. The underlying possible policy of terror orchestrated by an undeter-
mined group, the potential amount of resources exerted to commit the at-
tacks leading up to Hariri‘s attack, and Hariri‘s assassination itself, may 
  
238 Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgment and Opinion, ¶¶139–42 
(Dec. 5 2003). 
239 Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 565, 568 (Sept. 
28, 1998). 
240 Id. 
241 Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, supra note 239, ¶ 565; Statute of the Special Tribunal 
for Lebanon, supra note 12. 
242 Ann Cooper Committee to Protect Journalists, CPJ Urges UN to Expand Lebanon In-
quiry to Include Journalist Attacks, COMMITTEE TO PROTECT JOURNALISTS (Oct. 11, 2005), 
available at http://cpj.org/2005/10/cpj-urges-un-to-expand-lebanon-inquiry-to-include.php 
(presenting the attacks against Samir Qassir who, on June 2, 2005 was killed in a car bomb-
ing outside of his home in Beirut and May Chidiac who, on Sept. 25, lost her leg and arm in 
a car bombing near the city of Jouneih, Lebanon). 
243 Id. (presenting the fact that bombing victim, Samir Qassir, had highlighted President al-
Assad‘s inability to bring about real political reform in his writings and accordingly sup-
ported Lebanese independence). 
244 Id. 
245 Id. 
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fulfill the threshold for the first and second factors required for the assassi-
nation to be considered a crime against humanity. Only factual evidence 
brought before the court at the STL will determine if these factors, and in 
particular factor three, an extensive level of involvement of high-level polit-
ical or military authorities from any country in the underlying plan and the 
specific attack, in fact is met, should a crime against humanity be charged. 
The possibility that the Hariri assassination and other associated attacks 
being tried by the STL are crimes against humanity would allow for the 
STL Chambers to rule that the assassination was an international crime of 
terrorism. Allowing for the STL to eliminate claims of high-ranking state 
official immunities, if necessary. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The STL should be considered ―international‖ enough to eliminate 
high-ranking state official immunities. The tribunal has a parallel level of 
authority vested to it, and is characteristically very similar to international 
U.N.-created hybrid tribunals. Although terrorism is not a universally rec-
ognized ―international‖ crime to date, and has never been the sole interna-
tional criminal subject matter jurisdiction of a U.N.-sponsored tribunal, the 
STL is a groundbreaking international criminal court. Considering the cir-
cumstances surrounding the Hariri assassination and the recent develop-
ments in international law, it is likely that this institution will pave the way 
in creating an international definition for crimes of terrorism. This will al-
low for the prosecution of perpetrators of acts of terrorism equally egregious 
as the Hariri assassination and surrounding attacks to be prosecuted, regard-
less of the official rank the perpetrators hold. Allowing U.N.-created tribun-
als to eliminate immunities for high-ranking state officials that commit ex-
treme crimes of terrorism will ensure other global leaders are deterred from 
committing heinous crimes against innocent people in the future, further 
instilling the overall goals of justice underlying international law. 
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